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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In recent years, a relatively large increase has taken place in the amount of asylum-seekers that make 
their way towards Europe. Dubbed the ‘Syrian refugee crisis’, though with significant numbers of 
asylum-seekers from other countries as well,1 the arrival of large amounts of refugees sparked 
renewed debates regarding asylum and immigration policy in most European states. The 
Scandinavian states in the north were no exception.  
Though the Scandinavian states are often described as relatively similar in terms of the organisation 
of their welfare states (often called the ‘Scandinavian’ or ‘Nordic’ model),2 their responses towards 
the arrival of refugees within their borders have proven quite different. Focusing on Denmark and 
Sweden, the latter seems a much more attractive destination country in terms of both the amount 
asylum-seekers it has received in the past years and the percentage of non-nationals who are 
naturalised each year.3 Meanwhile, controversial Danish policies like the seizing of refugees’ 
valuables seem to designate Denmark as a much less welcoming country. Nevertheless Sweden, in 
2016, also tried to reduce the amount of asylum-seekers arriving within its borders, by implementing 
passport controls on the bridge across the Sound, citing the supposed role Denmark played as a 
‘transit country’ towards Sweden.4 In response, Denmark also implemented passport controls along 
its German border. 
Given the (perceived) differing responses towards the arrival of refugees in Denmark and Sweden, I 
would argue that it is interesting to look at the earlier development of Danish and Swedish asylum 
policy. In this thesis, I specifically want to look at the period between 1989 and 2001,  when notable 
divergences developed, to trace the reasons for why Denmark imposed more restrictive asylum 
policies during this time than Sweden. 
The specific question that I want to answer through this thesis is the following: ”When, how, and why 
did the Danish asylum system become more restrictive than the Swedish one between 1989 and 
2001?” In the analysis of these reasons, I place a particular emphasis on the different political 
perceptions of both countries’ welfare states on the one hand, and their different political culture on 
the other.  
The use of the nation-state as a unit of analysis is sometimes (rightly) criticised, as it might point 
towards a certain degree of ‘methodological nationalism’.5 However, I am analysing two separate 
political entities, each with their own legal system and political actors; and these state actors are the 
ones that shape national asylum systems. I would therefore argue that my use of the nation-state as 
a unit is legitimised. Of course, I will also change my focus throughout this thesis when other units of 
analysis are more relevant, such as municipal actors in both countries. 
1.1. Sub-questions 
To help answer my main research question and to highlight some of the important aspects of the 
development of Danish and Swedish asylum policy, I have formulated the following sub-questions:  
                                                                 
1 Eurostat, Countries of origin of non-EU asylum-seekers.  
2 See, for example,  
3 Eurostat, Asylum and first-time asylum applicants; Eurostat, Acquisition of citizenship and naturalisation rate.  
4 As reported by the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, on January 4 2016, in a quote from Swedish 
Migration Minister Morgan Johansson.  
5 Andreas Wimmer & Nina Glick-Schiller, ‘Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-state building, 
migration and the social sciences’. 
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‘What reasons were given for changes in the amount of refugees both countries accepted and the 
duration of their refugee visas?’ 
In terms of differing degrees of openness towards refugees, the amount of refugees being allowed 
into the respective countries is in my opinion a good starting point for an analysis. As I will explain in 
the following chapters, both Denmark and Sweden have at multiple points implemented measures to 
limit the amount of people seeking asylum within their borders, though these policies had differing 
degrees of permanence. However, the acceptance of refugees, from a political point of view, does 
not stop at the numbers of refugees a country receives. For example, while a country might take in 
large numbers of refugees, these refugees might have a limited freedom of movement within the 
country, fewer rights than ‘natives’, or it might be difficult for them to find work. I have therefore 
also formulated the following sub-question: 
‘What reasons were given for changes in refugees’ access to social amenities and citizenship 
opportunities?’ 
Since different political parties might have different views on refugee acceptance, and both Denmark 
and Sweden, as democracies, are subject to changes in their governments’ coalition parties, I also 
want to focus on the influence these changes in political culture had on the shape of policy.  I 
therefore formulated the following sub-question: 
‘What influence did changes in coalition and government parties have on the development of 
national asylum policy?’  
In my opinion, the (perceived) degree of popularity that anti-immigration parties (e.g. the Danish 
People’s Party, or Sweden’s New Democracy party) had amongst the national electorates also heavily 
influenced the degree to which governments implemented more restrictive immigration policies, 
regardless of whether those parties were in government or not. As I will explain in the following parts 
of this thesis, ‘mainstream’ parties might, for example, seek to co-opt anti-immigration parties’ 
policies to gain more electoral success or try to block attempts at implementing such policies in an 
attempt to keep them from gaining political legitimacy. The role of party representation in the media 
is thereby also an important factor to consider.  
Since anti-immigration parties in Sweden have had less political success than in Denmark, I also 
formulated the following sub-question to gain more insight into why certain parties failed, while 
others succeeded, and what this meant for immigration policy: 
‘Why were anti-immigration parties in Denmark more successful than in Sweden?’ 
1.2. Social and Scientific Relevance 
From an international perspective, when talking about welfare states, Scandinavia is often portrayed 
as a relatively homogeneous region. An influential work by sociologist Gøsta Esping-Andersen, for 
example, groups together the Scandinavian states within an ideal type of a ‘Scandinavian universalist 
welfare state’ that manages to incorporate citizens from all socio-economic segments of society.6 
However, with this thesis, I want to partially deconstruct this ‘Scandinavian model’. I thereby want to 
show that while, in terms of welfare state policy or immigration policy, the same ideals (like solidarity 
and equality) lie at the basis of their respective policies, the development and implementation of 
these often occurred along different paths.7 With this thesis, I also hope to contribute to the current 
                                                                 
6 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, p. 32.  
7 Grete Brochmann & Anniken Hagelund, ‘Comparison: A Model with Three Exceptions?’, p. 259.  
 
5 
public, political, and scientific debates regarding the reception and integration of refugees, both in 
Scandinavia and beyond. While the context of the ‘Syrian refugee crisis’ is certainly not the same as 
those in the period I am discussing, I want to help put the current refugee debates in a broader 
historical context by showing how Danish and Swedish political actors reacted to the previous largest 
refugee influx during the breaking-up of Yugoslavia, or the reasons for the seemingly diverging paths 
that both countries later took with regard to their openness towards refugees. 
With regard to scientific relevance, I also want to contribute to various debates in both the fields of 
history and the social sciences. As my theoretical framework shows, I employ a heavy political focus 
in this thesis, and pay special attention to the role of the welfare state in shaping political decision-
making. Through this, I hope to contribute to a range of debates regarding concepts like welfare 
chauvinism, the development of anti-immigration parties, and the politics of inclusion, exclusion and 
belonging.   
Furthermore, while a relatively large body of work already exists on comparisons between Danish 
and Swedish attitudes towards refugees and asylum-seekers, and a body of work exists comparing 
their respective welfare states, relatively little has been written on the role of the welfare state 
(discourses) in helping shape states’ asylum policies.8 With this thesis, I want to help address this 
topic by assessing the accessibility of the welfare state to refugees, and the reasons for changes in 
this accessibility over the years. By doing a comparative study, I thereby want to show how states 
with similar welfare systems came to develop markedly different asylum policies. 
1.3. Sources and Methodology 
With regard to sources, I will primarily base my analysis on parliamentary documents, in the form of 
debate minutes, bills and laws and reports of parliamentary committees.9 Through this focus on the 
political sphere, I want to find out both how the Danish and Swedish states see themselves, and how 
they want to be portrayed. For example, the laws they pass and the reports they produce frame the  
position and rights of refugees within their societies in a certain way. The discursive or ideological 
background of different ruling parties also influences this framing. 
As the amount of documents produced in the period I study is quite large, I have fi rstly identified key 
moments in the development of Danish and Swedish asylum policy (e.g. watershed legislation that 
was passed or turning-points in the reaction to the numbers of asylum-seekers) through the use of 
secondary sources and media sources, and snowball sampled my way through the relevant earlier 
documents that are referenced in those debates, legislations and reports.  
However, this focus also has its drawbacks. While commission and committee reports, paired with 
for example parliamentary debates, might give an idea of the stance of government and opposition 
parties towards the arrival of Bosnian refugees, they do not always give a clear insight into the 
decision-making process surrounding it. This drawback warranted the use of secondary sources to 
give broader explanations regarding these processes. Furthermore, because the time -frame of my 
thesis starts in 1989, there were some issues regarding the accessibility of sources. While all Swedish 
                                                                 
8 Though noteable exceptions exis t, l ike Brochmann & Hagelund’s Immigration Policy and the Scandinavian 
Welfare State, or Borevi’s ‘Diversity and Solidarity in Denmark and Sweden’.  
9 While Danish commission reports, ‘betænkninger’ (abbreviated as ‘bet.’ In the Danish archives) are written by 
either parliamentary commissions or expert commissions, Swedish ‘betänkanden’ solely consist of 
parliamentary commission reports. Swedish expert committee reports are designated with the abbreviation 
‘SOU’, which stands for ‘Statens offentliga utredningar’ (The state’s public investigations). As the abbreviation is 
used in both official documents and the Swedish archives, I have also chosen to describe these reports as 
‘SOU’s. 
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parliamentary minutes are available online, practically none of the Danish ones are (at the time of 
writing). Furthermore, some archives of, for example, newspapers have restrictions regarding the 
(amount of) articles that can be viewed from outside their respective countries. I solved this by 
visiting the national library in Copenhagen, but the sheer amount of (inaccessible) newspapers 
limited certain areas of analysis.  
As I mentioned earlier, civil society and the media can also have a large impact on the political 
decision-making process. While I presume that a sufficiently large or controversial enough public 
debate shows up in the explanations regarding policy-decisions in the committee reports, these still 
afford a relatively narrow insight into the broader societal contexts. Where possible, I therefore 
looked at newspapers, or other media coverage, of important political decisions to provide this 
context, though the analysis of primary sources from the Danish and Swedish parliaments is still the 
primary focus of this thesis. 
1.4. Structure of the Thesis 
Having explained my research questions and the sources and methodology I draw upon to answer 
them, I will explain the theoretical basis of my research in the next chapter. In the subsequent 
chapters, I will analyse the Danish and Swedish asylum policy through three main thematic foci: 
border policy (chapter three), integration policy (chapter four), and the varying successes of anti-
immigration parties (chapter five). In the final chapter, I will conclude my thesis by summarising my 
main arguments, and by answering my research questions. As will become apparent in the following 
chapters, my main argument will be that differences in welfare and integration philosophy and the 
comparatively greater success of Danish anti-immigration parties led to a greater strictness in Danish 
asylum policy. 
While there is some chronological overlap between the themes described above, I employ this 
division to show that asylum policy affects (and is affected by) multiple areas of governance and 
policy-making. In that sense, I partially follow Didier Fassin’s model of ‘borders and boundaries’ to 
show that asylum policy does not end at the national (physical) borders.  10 I will elaborate further on 
this dichotomy in my theoretical framework. Through this thematic division, I also want to make a 
clearer comparison between the Danish and Swedish asylum ‘restrictiveness’. By comparing different 
components of their policy, I want to give a clearer overview of the differences and similarities 
between the states’ policy-developments, and the reasons behind this difference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
10 Didier Fassin, ‘Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries. The Governmentality of Immigration in Dark Times’. 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
When talking about Scandinavian welfare states, it is easy to spot similarities between their welfare 
regimes. The sociologist Esping-Andersen, for example, describes the ideal type of the Scandinavian 
welfare regimes as a universalist model, with broad social services and a focus on public 
employment.11 The focus on (full) employment and the prevention of welfare-dependency is often 
called the ‘workline’ within the Scandinavian welfare regime.12 
Given the long historic developments that shaped the national welfare states, and the influence 
those welfare states have had on their respective societies, it could be argued that the ideas at the 
foundation of the welfare states have slowly become a part of the respective nations’ national 
identity.13 However, while the general organisation of the welfare states in Scandinavia is similar, one 
could argue that the notions of the role of the welfare state within the respective societies differs.  
Generally speaking, in relation to one another, the Swedish welfare state could be viewed as the 
more ‘multiculturally-focused’ of the two,14 while the Danish one appears to be focused more on 
cultural homogeneity, whereby an ‘outsider’ first needs to become properly ‘Danish’ before being 
able to reap its full benefits.15 In terms of immigrant integration, different ideas regarding solidarity 
and equality that lie at the basis of the welfare states are also reflected in the states’ immigration 
policies. As Karen Borevi argues, the Swedish ‘philosophy of integration’ seems to stem from a notion 
that the welfare state promotes social cohesion and integration (through participation in the labour 
market), thereby creating national solidarity; while the Danish one seems to stem from a notion that 
the welfare state is created by social cohesion and solidarity.16 Therefore, while cultural sameness 
and integration are seen as vital for the existence of the Danish welfare state, the Swedish system 
places less emphasis on cultural integration, as participation in the welfare state and labour market 
will promote integration anyway.17 
It would, however, be inaccurate to view the Danish and Swedish welfare states as unchanging 
throughout the period of interest in my thesis.18 Like many European countries, Denmark and 
Sweden have been subjected to neoliberal economic pressures, and their effects on notions of 
solidarity and social resilience, which lie at the basis of the welfare states, should not be 
overlooked.19 Hall and Lamont, for example, argue that neoliberal ideas might lead to the 
privatisation of public services and an increasing focus on the economic mobility of the individual. 
This includes an increasing focus of the welfare state to promote ‘self-reliance’ on an individual 
                                                                 
11 Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. 
12 Borevi, ‘Sweden: The Flagship of Multiculturalism’, p. 30. 
13 Steffen Jöhncke, ‘Integrating Denmark: The Welfare State as  a National(ist) Accomplishment’, p.39. 
14 Marita Eastmond, ‘Egalitarian Ambitions, Constructions of Difference: The Paradoxes of Refugee Integration 
in Sweden’, p.292. 
15 See, for example, Karen Borevi, ‘Diversity and Solidarity in Denmark and Sweden’, p.37 9; Karen Fog Olwig, 
‘‘Integration’: Migrants and Refugees between Scandinavian Welfare Societies and Family Relations’, p. 183.  
16 Borevi, ‘Diversity and Solidarity in Denmark and Sweden’, p. 367. 
17 Ibid. p. 379. 
18 Jens Rydgren, Från Skattemissnöje till Etnisk Nationalism: Högerpopulism och parlementarisk 
högerextremism i Sverige, p. 43. 
19 As to why neoliberalism influenced Scandinavian societies, a proper examination would warrant a thesis of 
its own. Though multiple reasons  can be found in the literature. Authors l ike Jens Rydgren attribute this to 
broad political developments  l ike the ‘fall  of communism’ or the influence of the growing policy pressures from 
Britain (under Thatcher) and the US (under Reagan). 19 See Jens Rydgren, ‘Sweden: The Scandinavian Exception’, 
p. 137-138. 
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level.20 However, the presence of social institutions like strong unions and the idea of the welfare 
state in a state’s national imagination might prevent the (perceived) social resilience of a society 
from declining too much under neoliberal pressures.21 
While an increasing focus on individualism might appear to warrant an increasing focus on restrictive 
migration policies, so as to maximise the economic chances of the ‘native’ population , neoliberal 
pressures might, under certain circumstances, actually promote a degree of multiculturalism.22 From 
an economic point of view, migrants can be seen as economic actors that seek to maximise their 
economic potential either at ‘home’ or abroad, while cultural markers like food or fashion can be 
monetised as well.23 Increasing focus on neoliberal policies also meant that under free movement 
and labour policies, minorities would gain increasing rights to participation in the welfare state. 24 
Multiculturalism and neoliberalisation would therefore become increasingly associated with one 
another. However, while minorities were increasingly included in national welfare schemes, states 
did little to address issues like the social marginalisation of certain minority groups, in effect enacting 
a form of ‘inclusiveness without solidarity’.25 Kymlicka argues that protest against either 
neoliberalism or immigration therefore often takes a diametrically opposed form of ‘solidarity 
without inclusiveness’,26 which can be described as a form of welfare chauvinism: a rhetoric that is 
not anti-welfare, but seeks to bar ‘outsiders’ from reaping the benefits of the welfare state. 27 Despite 
the economic principles of neoliberal theory, however, the perceived ‘cultural threat’ that increasing 
immigration under a neoliberal policy might bring is sometimes seen as a greater danger to society 
than mere ‘economic pressure’ on the welfare state.28 
When speaking about the ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of a society, I would argue that it is useful to 
incorporate the concept of ‘imagined community’ in my thesis. Through this concept, Benedict 
Anderson argues that ideas regarding citizenship are based on an (imagined) notion of shared 
identity, values, and ideas.29 Earlier, I already gave the example that welfare states, due to their 
perceived history of national solidarity, often play a role in the formation of national identities.30 This 
then raises the question whether ‘outsiders’, who might not be seen as part of a shared history, have 
equal access to social amenities on a par with ‘native’ citizens.  
While refugees and asylum-seekers might therefore cross physical borders to reach their countries of 
refuge, they still might encounter social boundaries that limit their freedom of (socio-economic) 
movement and participation within their host societies, based on their perceived outsider-status.31 
This ‘borders’ versus ‘boundaries’ dichotomy is also similar to the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ sphere that 
authors such as Brochmann and Hagelund describe, as both make a distinction between the physical 
borders of a country and the policy regarding immigrants within those borders, but see both ‘spheres’ 
                                                                 
20 Peter A. Hall  & Michèle Lamont, ‘Introduction’, p. 6. 
21 Ibid., p. 17. 
22 Will Kymlicka, ‘Neoliberal Multiculturalism?’, p. 108-109. 
23 Ibid. p. 109. 
24 Kymlicka, ‘Solidarity in Diverse Societies: beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and  welfare chauvinism’, p. 6-7. 
25 Ibid. p. 7. 
26 Ibid. p. 7-8. 
27 Jørgen Goul Andersen & Tor Bjørklund, ‘Structural Changes and New Cleavages: the Progress Parties in 
Denmark and Norway’, p. 214; Kymlicka ‘Solidarity in Diverse Societies: beyond neoliberal mul ticulturalism and 
welfare chauvinism’, p. 8. 
28 Kymlicka, ‘Solidarity in Diverse Societies: beyond neoliberal multiculturalism and welfare chauvinism’, p.11.  
29 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities.  
30 Karen Fog Olwig & Karsten Pærregaard, ‘Introduction: “Strangers” in the Nation’, p. 15. 
31 Fassin, ‘Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries. The Governmentality of Immigration in Dark Times’, p. 214 -
215. 
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as part of the same migration policy spectrum. This dichotomy is reflected in the structure of this 
thesis, whereby border policy and (social) integration policy have separate chapters dedicated to 
them. However, as the linkages between the chapters and the overlap in policy will show, it is 
difficult to make a strict demarcation between the two concepts.  
As the above example already partially demonstrated, the analysis and reproduction of national 
identity often tends to focus on ethnic identity, and might therefore be difficult to properly 
operationalise. 32 In the following chapters (especially chapter four) I will therefore predominantly 
focus on the notions of national identity that are present within Danish and Swedish integration 
policy, whereby a certain knowledge of the national culture is often required of immigrants, and is 
therefore ‘quantified’ within those requirements.  
With regard to imagined communities, it is then also interesting to look at the degree of ‘sameness’ 
migrants need to achieve before they (if ever) are regarded as a full part of their community. Olwig 
and Pærregaard, for example, give a chronological overview of the different meanings and 
connotations the concept of ‘integration’ has had in Danish politics, ranging from a purely economic 
meaning towards an increasing focus on the perceived irreconcilable cultural differences between 
‘Danes’ and ‘non-Danes’.33 In practice, however, concepts like ‘integration’ are often used 
interchangeably with concepts like ‘assimilation’ in both public and political debates. The tensions 
between notions of ‘universalism’ and ‘alikeness’ or ‘equality’, in terms of rights to the welfare state, 
are often central concepts in the study of the Scandinavian welfare states.34 
When discussing imagined communities and integration, it is also useful to look at the requirements 
one needs to fulfil in order to gain citizenship, and the rights and duties linked to that citizenship, as a 
form of ‘politics of belonging’. As Nira Yuval-Davis argues, citizenship is not just a way through which 
‘imagined communities’ can be demarcated (in ‘citizens’ and ‘non-citizens’). Instead, it is also a way 
to study larger ‘politics of belonging’ and identify the degree to which certain groups in society are 
seen as ‘belonging’ to a certain nation-state, while also focusing on ways through which policy can 
create feelings of belonging to a state, within those groups.35 The right to work in, and migrate to, a 
country are thereby seen as examples of the interplay between notions of ‘belonging’ and the 
granting of certain rights.36 For example, people that are seen as too ‘different’, and therefore as not 
belonging to a certain imagined community, can be forbidden or actively discouraged to migrate to 
and work in a certain country.  
As concepts like ‘imagined community’ and ‘belonging’ already show, I would argue that it is 
important to look at the ‘discursive’ context of both bordering processes and the creation o f 
boundaries whereby political and social framings, such as discourses regarding the differences 
between social groups, play an important role.37 The implementation of restrictive policy and 
discourse could thereby also be seen as a form of ‘spectacle’, meant to appease certain (political) 
groups within a given society.38 It can also be argued that the framing of certain refugee groups, by 
for example categorising them in ‘desirable’ or ‘undesirable’ categories or highlighting their 
‘humanitarian’ need, becomes an increasingly important aspect for the granting of asylum visas, and 
                                                                 
32 Borevi, ‘Sweden: The Flagship of Multiculturalism’, p. 26.  
33 Olwig & Pærregaard, ‘Introduction: “Strangers” in the Nation’, p. 12-14. 
34 Jöhncke, ‘Integrating Denmark: The Welfare State as a National(ist) Accomplishment’, p. 40.  
35 Nira Yuval-Davis, ‘Belonging and the Politics of Belonging’. 
36 Ibid. p. 208. 
37 James Wesley Scott, ‘European Politics of Borders, Border Symbolism and Cross-Border Cooperation’, p. 88. 
38 Fassin, ‘Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries. The Governmentality of Immigration in Dark Times’, p. 220.  
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possible citizenship, to groups of asylum-seekers that try to gain access to European countries.39 
Furthermore, this humanitarian framing can often be used to legitimise a range of (opposing) policy 
measures.40 Discursive bordering practices during the 1990s should also be seen in the context of an 
increasing internationalisation of border policy that, for example, resulted in ‘Fortress Europe’. When 
discussing national border policy, it is therefore also useful to look at the concept of ‘policing at a 
distance’, whereby control over national borders is increasingly externalised to other European 
states.41 For example, the establishment of immigration offices in the Balkans during the crisis in 
Yugoslavia meant that, in practice, the border crossing for refugees in the region took place in the 
Balkans, and not at the physical Scandinavian borders. 
When discussing national policy and the influence of ideas regarding national identity and imagined 
community, I also argue that it is important to look at the role that the concept of ‘political culture’ 
plays in shaping governments’ decisions regarding access to the welfare state. In this thesis I employ 
Piet de Rooy’s model of political culture, whereby he looks at the general shape of the political 
system (e.g. the presence and contents of its constitution) and the organisation of its parliament (e.g. 
the presence of political parties), and the interplay between civil society and the political system.42 As 
I also mentioned in the ‘sub-questions’ section, different layers in politics and general society might 
influence the political decision-making process. Plenty of examples of how the philosophies and 
preferences of different political parties influenced Danish and Swedish policy, or how a society’s or 
political system’s ‘permissiveness’ or ‘restrictiveness’ influences the degree of influence of non-
mainstream parties, can be found in the literature.43   
With regard to the growing popularity of anti-immigration parties (and sentiments), most theories 
fall inside a ‘supply-side’ versus ‘demand-side’ spectrum that seeks to explain why certain parties 
become successful, while others do not. ‘Supply-side’ theories focus more heavily on the political 
sphere, which parties present themselves to the electorate, the spread of, and differences between 
anti-immigration policies, and so on. ‘Demand-side’ theories focus more on societal issues that 
generate anti-immigration electoral success.44 However, as the ‘spectrum’ aspect implies, a stronger 
focus on either side does not automatically exclude the other from these theories. One of the more 
dominant supply-side theories is the concept of ‘political opportunity structures’, whereby an 
emphasis lies on the dominant political culture that influences the degree of ‘extremity’ with which a 
party is branded, and for example the degree to which ‘mainstream’ parties are willing to cooperate 
with anti-immigration parties and their policies.45 With regard to my own research, I lean towards a 
supply-side analysis, because I focus predominantly on the Danish and Swedish political spheres. 
Nevertheless, my research could also fall under what Rensmann and Miller call ‘mixed’ models, as I 
also incorporate discursive and ideological practices that, while originating in my analysis from the 
                                                                 
39 Fassin, ‘Policing Borders, Producing Boundaries. The Governmentality of Immigration in Dark Times’, p. 220-
221. 
40 Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present, p. 14. 
41 Didier Bigot & Elspeth Guild, ‘Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies’. 
42 Piet de Rooy, A Tiny Spot on the Earth: The Political Culture of the Netherlands in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Century, p. 12-14.  
43 Regarding the influence of political parties, see Peter Hervik, ‘The Emergenc e of Neo-Nationalism in Denmark, 
1991-2001’, p. 97; regarding permissiveness and restrictiveness, see David Art, Inside the Radical Right: The 
Development of Anti-Immigration Parties in Western Europe, p. 44-45. 
44 Lars Rensmann & Jennifer Miller, ‘Xenophobia & Anti -Immigrant Politics’.  
45 Roger Eatwell, ‘Charisma and the Revival of the European Right’, p. 102. 
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political sphere (and, to a lesser degree, the media), these influence both political and social or 
electoral processes.46   
With regard to the success or failure (e.g. in terms of political influence or electoral success) of anti-
immigration parties, I would also argue that it is important to look at the influence that the media 
might have on politics. Political parties might, on the one hand, use the media for ‘framing’ purposes, 
or to introduce certain topics into public debates.47 On the other hand, controversial topics, and 
‘underdog parties’ might also be used by media outlets in order to attract a larger audience. 48  
David Art also argues that a party’s activists and members are an important factor in determining the 
eventual success or failure of parties, as they help build the party during its early stages and, among 
other things, are a pool from which parties can draw their parliamentary candidates.49 
As I already mentioned in the introduction, the reactions of ‘mainstream’ parties to the policy of 
more populist, anti-immigration parties, influences the legitimacy of those parties. Authors like 
Mazzoleni thereby also argue that the mainstream media, in criticising populist parties, might 
actually help populist parties win votes by allowing them to frame themselves as a legitimate threat 
to the parties that make up the ‘Establishment’.50 The charisma (though a difficult to operationalise 
concept) of important figures within the party thereby might also heavily influence the degree of 
success parties have in the media.51 This ‘charisma thesis’ is, however, disputed by David Art, who 
argues that leaders might be seen as charismatic precisely because they are successful, and that 
perceptions of charisma stem from the degree of success a party (leader) has, instead of charisma 
causing success.52 Personally, I would argue that both ‘theses’ have a certain degree of validity to 
them.  
Nevertheless, when discussing government policy, it is often useful to keep in mind that a ‘gap’ can 
exist between the rhetoric of political actors, or policy-measures that are being drafted, and the 
actual implementation of policy ‘on the ground’. The gap between the goals and results of 
immigration policy might therefore widen, prompting increased hostility towards immigrants with 
the electorate.53 
2.1. Hypotheses 
With regard to the ‘when’ part of my research question on the turn towards restrictiveness in 
Denmark, my main hypothesis is that Danish and Swedish asylum policy did not significantly differ 
until after the resolution of the ‘Bosnian refugee crisis’, around 1995. Based on my preliminary 
research, I presumed that, while differences did exist between the Danish and Swedish response to 
the crisis, the general policy line (shown by, for example, deliberations between the governments) 
was similar. In the later years, these differences would at least become much more apparent. My 
presumption thereby is that the Danish asylum policy became significantly more restrictive than the  
Swedish one during the second half of the 1990s. 
                                                                 
46 Rensmann & Mi l ler, ‘Xenophobia & Anti -Immigrant Politics’.  
47 Eatwell, ‘Charisma and the Revival of the European Right’, p. 114. 
48 Hervik, ‘The Emergence of Neo-Nationalism in Denmark, 1991-2001’, p.100; Gianpietro Mazzoleni, ‘Populism 
and the Media’, p. 54. 
49 Art, Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigration Parties in Western Europe, p. 22. 
50 Mazzoleni, ‘Populism and the Media’, p. 57. 
51 Eatwell, ‘Charisma and the Revival of the European Right’, p. 103. 
52 Art, Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigration Parties in Western Europe, p. 57.  
53 James F. Hollifield, Philip L. Martin & Pia M. Orrenius, ‘The Dilemmas of Immigration Control’, p. 3 -4. 
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When debating the ‘how’ part of my research question, I firstly argue that it is important to 
deconstruct the concept of ‘asylum policy’ into its internal and external components. In the chapter 
division of this thesis, this is done through a focus on border policy (chapter 3) and integration policy 
(chapter 4). I presume that theories like Kymlicka’s model of solidarity and inclusiveness, or Borevi’s 
‘philosophies of integration’ are relatively generalising immigration and asylum policy.54 On the one 
hand, these kinds of theories are usually based on policy developments over the course of multiple 
decades or based on cases that that are quite dissimilar to the Danish and Swedish cases that I am 
studying. On the other hand, my hypothesis is that these theories should be more nuanced with 
regard to this ‘borders’ and ‘boundaries’ dichotomy that I described earlier. When discussing the 
openness or permissiveness of asylum policy I presume that it is possible that countries become 
more restrictive in the area of border policy, while maintaining a relative permissiveness in terms of 
integration policy. My hypothesis for the ‘how’ part of my research question is that , though the 
border policies of both countries remained relatively similar, both states diverged in terms of their 
integration policies. Using Borevi's concept of a 'society-centred' welfare state, I presume that the 
Danish integration policy focused much more heavily than the Swedish one on cultural integration 
and 'sameness' as a prerequisite to access institutions like the welfare state or labour market.  
One of the main hypotheses for the reasons behind eventual differences in policy between the two 
countries is that Danish anti-immigration parties gained more electoral success, and therefore 
political influence, than their Swedish counterparts. The degree of attention in the media that anti-
immigration parties receive also strongly influence both the parties’ electoral success and their 
political influence. While the Danish People’s Party would for example only ‘enter’ government in 
2001, by supporting a centre-right minority government, my hypothesis is that their growing 
electoral popularity in the second half of the 1990s prompted the coalition parties to take a more 
restrictive stance on immigration.  
I do not presume, however, that anti-immigration parties are the only reason for differences in the 
restrictiveness of Danish and Swedish asylum policy. For example, the Swedish policy also become 
more restrictive after the Bosnian Crisis, even though no popular anti -immigration party was present 
at the time. I therefore presume that ‘societal’ issues, like the cost of hosting refugees, perceived 
disconnects from the labour market, and increasing costs of the national welfare states, also played 
an important role in the decision-making process regarding the shape of asylum policy. While supply-
side arguments, in the form of the presence of anti -immigration parties, are important, turns 
towards asylum-restrictiveness can therefore not be completely explained without an examination of 
demand-side arguments as well. 
With regard to the factors influencing the degree of success of anti -immigration parties, I firstly 
presume that, following the line of argumentation in David Art’s book, the organisation of these 
parties plays a major role.55 In-fighting or unclear policy lines might for example influence the degree 
of trust that the electorate has in them. Furthermore, as my theoretical framework shows, I presume 
that political culture also plays a large role in determining which parties are seen as possible partners 
in coalition governments, and seen as viable parties by the electorate. For example, a party that 
breaks political taboos, even though they are electorally successful, might be seen as too extreme to 
cooperate with the other parties. Lastly, Kymlicka’s notion of increasing welfare chauvinism as a 
result of changing economic conditions provides the last factor in my hypothesis on the growing 
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popularity of anti-immigration parties, and highlights the two main pillars of my overall analysis: 
economic or welfare rhetoric and political culture.56 
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Chapter 3: Border policy  
The refugee crisis that emerged as a result of the wars in Yugoslavia was not the first time that 
Denmark and Sweden debated taking in refugees. Over the course of the Cold War, various groups of 
displaced and persecuted people had made their way towards Europe. Sweden, especially, had taken 
up a role as a neutral country that protected international human rights. Around the end of the Cold 
War, however, refugees would become increasingly politicised in both countries. 
In this chapter, I will describe and explain the choices that both states made with regard to their 
border policy in especially the first half of the 1990s. I will thereby start with an overview of both 
countries’ refugee situations at the end of the Cold War and an explanation of the reasons behind a 
proposed Swedish turn towards asylum-restrictiveness. I will then explain the states’ different 
choices regarding the implementation of temporary asylum measures during the Bosnian refugee 
crisis. I will subsequently discuss the role that various framings in the media had on policy -
development. Lastly, I will focus on the increasing internationalisation of border policy in a European 
context during this period.  
3.1. Pre-1989 Border Policy 
The end of 1989 would see a dramatic shift in the political situation in Europe. The fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the opening up of the Iron Curtain, as well as the increasing number of Eastern-European 
states that distanced themselves from the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union, would gradually mean 
the end for the political division of Europe along the lines of Cold War politics.  
The significance of these first cracks in the Eastern Bloc did not go by unnoticed in Northern Europe 
either. The end of the Iron Curtain brought prospects of peace, trade, and even a possible expansion 
eastwards of the European Union.57 In Denmark, only a populist minority in the opposition focused 
on possible migration issues, such as increasing numbers of asylum-seekers.58 
The Swedish government, while optimistic about the opening up of the Eastern Bloc, also viewed it 
through a more pragmatic lens. In December 1989, Maj-Lis Lööw, the Social Democratic Minister for 
Migration, addressed the Swedish parliament regarding the implementation of  a more restrictive 
asylum system. She explained that, because of (expected) increasing demands for asylum in Sweden, 
it would become difficult to grant every asylum seeker a ‘worthy reception’. The government’s 
solution would therefore be to limit the granting of refugee visas to those asylum-seekers that 
fulfilled the requirements for refugeehood enshrined in the UN’s refugee conventions, or those in 
particularly urgent need for protection.59 
To understand both governments’ relative differences in attitude, it is necessary to take a brief look 
at the Scandinavian asylum situation in the decade before. Looking at the adjusted numbers in the 
illustration on the next page, it becomes clear that the number of applications in both states steadily 
increased during the 1980s. Denmark especially showed a marked growth, which has several causes: 
the country, for example, adopted a much more generous Aliens Act in 1983, but the ongoing war 
between Iran and Iraq also contributed to a spike in the amount of asylum applications.60 
However, while Denmark and Sweden took in relatively comparable numbers throughout the second 
half of the decade, this changed quite abruptly in 1989. The amount of Danish applications halved, 
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while the amount of Swedish applications rose by about 50 percent. A major factor at play was the 
growing instability of the Eastern Bloc, with large increases in the amount of applications from 
countries like Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.61 Given the large increase in asylum applications in Sweden 
between 1988 and 1989, compared to the significant decrease in Denmark, it is therefore 
understandable that the government regarded the opening up of the Eastern Bloc with mixed 
feelings.  
I would argue that it is also important to look at the role that Sweden, as a neutral country, played 
concerning refugee-acceptance during the Cold War. In the post-World War II era, Sweden 
maintained an outward profile based on international solidarity. Part of the reason for this image 
was Sweden’s relatively open labour immigration and asylum schemes, through which they took in a 
relatively large number of political refugees under either scheme over the years.62 As the number of 
asylum applications started to increase in 1989, it was this same generous and efficient asylum 
system, as well as the positive reception of refugees in local municipalities, that was regarded by the 
government as causing asylum-seekers to choose Sweden over other European countries to lodge 
their application.63  
3.2. The Swedish Lucia Decision 
The prospect of a continued trend of increasing amounts of asylum-seekers travelling to Sweden due 
to the instability in the Eastern Bloc (Lööw, the Minister for Migration, for example specifically 
mentioned the arrival of about 5000 Bulgarian Turks as a new, large asylum-seeking group)64 
eventually pushed the Swedish government to implement a more restrictive asylum policy. In 1989, 
the Swedish asylum system differentiated four separate categories under which asylum-seekers 
could receive a permanent residence permit: convention refugees (who fulfilled the UN Refugee 
                                                                 
61 UNHCR, Asylum Applications in Industrialized Countries, p. 39. 
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64 Ibid. p. 78. 
 
Ill. 1 Asylum Applications in Denmark and Sweden 1981-1989 per capita, adjusted per 100.000 population. 
Sources: UNHCR, ‘Asylum Applications in Industrialized Countries’; Statistics Denmark; Statistics Sweden.  
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Convention’s requirements); people who had an otherwise especially urgent need for protection; as 
well as conscientious objectors; and ‘de facto’ refugees (without immediate need for protection).65 
After the announcement of the government’s policy change on 13 December 1989, which later 
would be called the ‘Lucia Decision’, only two categories for asylum would be recognised: Convention 
refugees and those in particular need of protection.66  
Though the measure was contested by the opposition, who saw it as too harsh in relation to the 
degree of ‘crisis’ the country was going through, the government argued that it was an unfortunate 
necessity.67 The Migration Minister framed the issue as a problem of space, and humanitarianism, 
stating that there were too few houses available to provide asylum-seekers with a ‘worthy 
reception’.68 It is hereby important to note the relative lack of ‘cultural’ arguments and arguments 
relating to the ‘cost’ of immigration within the framing of the issue at this point.  
While the minister presented the issue as a problem of space, and inadequate means to properly 
house refugees, I would argue that it is also important to link this measure to the earlier described 
notion that Sweden’s reputation of generosity was a problematic ‘pull-factor’. The move to restrict 
the openness of the border could therefore, in my opinion, be seen as a ‘discursive bordering 
practice’ whereby border-restrictiveness was framed as a solution to both the ‘problem of space’ and 
the problematic generous image of the country.69 
With help from the Moderate Party in the opposition, the intention to implement a more restrictive 
refugee policy found a majority in parliament. A commission of inquiry was subsequently appointed 
to explore possible opportunities for reform. The government wanted to pass the necessary reforms 
with a certain degree of urgency, as the prospective of increasing immigration flows, and the possible 
costs those would bear, had not changed in the meantime.70   
The majority of their report was in line with the government’s wishes to reduce the amount of 
asylum-categories. One of the more interesting parts, however, concerned the question of 
introducing a broad temporary asylum scheme, which could replace parts of the existing asylum 
system. The standard asylum procedure usually led to permanent residence visas for the asylum-
seekers that were accepted. The general opinion of the committee was that temporary protection 
visas should not be introduced for all cases. Even temporary stay in Sweden could cause refugees to 
form ‘significant ties’ to the country, and severing them could be considered inhumane according to 
the commission. Nevertheless, the commission also stated that sudden mass-migration movements 
were still possible and that a temporary protection clause should remain in the Aliens Act as a 
possible tool to handle such an event.71 This caveat would become important during the Bosnian 
Crisis, when just such a mass-movement of asylum-seekers happened. 
After the quite heated debates in 1989, it is to a certain degree ironic that the measures set out in 
the ‘Lucia Decision’ were not implemented for quite a few years. The Swedish election of 1991 would 
prove to be somewhat of a turning point in Swedish political history. While the Swedish government 
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had a sufficient majority in parliament to pass the bill, the actual vote on it was delayed by the 1991 
general elections.72 However, these elections would see a relative political upheaval with the 
appearance of the anti-immigration New Democracy (Ny Demokrati) party. Running on an anti-
immigration and anti-established parties campaign, the party shook Swedish political culture. While 
the Lucia Decision entailed immigration restrictions, all political parties held a general consensus that 
Sweden, in essence, should remain a pro-refugee country.73 While a more detailed analysis of the 
circumstances of their founding will be left for chapter five, it is important to mention that New 
Democracy was expected to gain about 12 percent of the vote. As New Democracy was breaking 
political taboos with its anti-immigration rhetoric, the established parties sought to prevent it from 
gaining political legitimacy by trying to de-politicise migration during the 1991 election campaigns.74 
This included discussions about immigration restrictions.  
After the Social Democrats lost the elections, the new centre-right coalition took a comparatively 
pro-refugee stance. Though the Moderate Party headed the coalition, their coalition partners had 
taken a pro-refugee stance during the election campaigns, enticing the coalition to follow suit.75 
Furthermore, the new government expected the number of asylum-applications to decline in the 
near future, which removed the ‘problem of space’ argument that legitimised the initial turn towards 
restrictiveness.76 However, since New Democracy also advocated similar measures as were put forth 
in the by then withdrawn ‘Lucia’ bill, it is also plausible that the new government  parties took a more 
pro-asylum stance to distance themselves further from the populist party.77  
This ‘distancing motivation’ seems validated by the fact that Sweden implemented the planned 
border-restrictions after the Social Democrats won the 1994 elections. At the same time, New 
Democracy lost all of their seats in parliament. As Abiri notes, the Social Democrats and Moderates 
therefore encountered fewer objections to asylum-restrictiveness (like lending legitimacy to New 
Democracy) than was the case during the attempted de-politicisation of migration during the 1991 
election campaigns.78 I will return in greater detail to the influence that anti-immigration populist 
parties, like New Democracy, had on mainstream parties in chapter five.  
3.3. Temporary Asylum 
On the eve of the Bosnian War, the official stance of the Swedish government therefore was more or 
less a reiteration of the earlier, relatively generous asylum policy. Meanwhile, in Denmark too, an 
albeit somewhat less intense public and political debate took place regarding immigrants and 
refugees in Danish society. After the increase in asylum applications in the 1980s, a broad debate 
took place in the summer of 1990 about the exact living conditions of immigrants and refugees in 
Denmark, and the costs that the Danish immigrant policy bore.79 The Danish sociologist Lise Togeby 
sought to illustrate the growing public debate regarding immigration and asylum by looking at the 
amount of articles published about immigration in the national Danish newspapers. She showed that 
over the course of the 1980s, a steady increase in coverage of immigration-issues took place in the 
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Danish papers, though the peak would only take place in 1993, at the height of the Bosnian Crisis.80 
Though later authors argue that Togeby’s quantitative approach failed to capture the nuances of the 
Danish public’s positive or negative perceptions of refugees and immigrants, I stil l agree with her 
argument that the degree of  media-coverage of a certain topic shows that there is an audience, or a 
market, for a sustained focus on a point of public debate.81 
Despite the public and political debates about immigration in both countries, and remarks about 
possible rises in Yugoslav refugee numbers, neither Denmark nor Sweden had foreseen the violence 
into which Yugoslavia would disintegrate, and the scale of the refugee crisis it would cause.  
In the graph below, I have plotted the amount of asylum applications that both countries received 
during the crisis in Yugoslavia. It is hereby important to note that the Danish statistics agency only 
started differentiating between Yugoslav and Bosnian applications in 1992, while the Swedish one 
did so in 1993. This is also one of the causes for the sharp drop in Yugoslav applications for both 
countries. It is nonetheless still important to differentiate between Bosnian and Yugoslav applications, 
as both groups were framed differently with regard to aspects like their need for protection. As I will 
discuss later on in this chapter, a different policy was therefore made for both groups. 
Given the unexpectedly large numbers of asylum applications, both the Danish and Swedish 
migration authorities quickly reported that their systems were being overwhelmed. Even before the 
bulk of the asylum-seekers arrived, Venstre (the Danish Liberal Party) who were the largest 
government party at that point, entered the political debate with a statement that ‘Denmark only 
has a limited amount of resources’ for the reception and processing of refugees, and that that limit 
was being reached.82 However, the question of temporary asylum, in relation to the migrants’ rights 
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Ill. 2 Amount of Bosnian and Yugoslav asylum applications 1991-1995 per capita, adjusted per 100.000 population. 
Sources: UNHCR, ‘Asylum Applications in Industrialized Countries’; Statistics Denmark; Statistics Sweden. 
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and protection-practicalities, was still seen as too difficult to answer.83 
The refugee crisis started at a particularly bad time for Sweden, as it was in the middle of an 
economic crisis.84 Furthermore, as the graph shows, the amount of asylum applications they received 
was significantly higher per capita than that of Denmark. Like in Denmark, the debates regarding the 
reception of refugees relatively quickly turned to the question of the cost this would bear. As I 
mentioned earlier, the possibility of a large-scale movement of refugees towards Sweden was 
something that the government already deemed possible in 1991.85 While the subsequently 
appointed committee tasked with tackling the Yugoslav refugee problem advocated streamlining the 
application-processing procedures to cut costs, temporary asylum measures were still out of the 
question.86  
While Denmark and Sweden were struggling to come up with ways to effectively handle the 
increasing amounts of asylum-seekers that were seeking protection in Northern Europe, other 
(Western-) European countries were facing many of the same challenges. In July 1992, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees therefore convened an emergency meeting. Recognising that the flow of 
people out of the Former Yugoslavia was reaching “dramatic proportions”, and that the situation was 
both rapidly draining the resources of receiving states while a resolution to the conflict was not yet in 
sight, the goal of the meeting was to formulate an effective response at an international level.87 The 
response that the participants to the meeting endorsed focused, among other things, heavily on 
burden-sharing mechanisms, and the need for international solidarity as the basis of any 
comprehensive approach. One of the measures particularly advocated by the UNHCR as a way to 
lighten the burden the refugee crisis placed on the resources of the receiving states. was the 
implementation of temporary protection measures for a (then yet) indeterminate amount of time ; 
the same measures that both Denmark and Sweden until then had decided to not yet implement.88   
The UNHCR’s advice came as a surprise to Scandinavian politicians. Though both Denmark and 
Sweden had debated the measures, the only large-scale implementation of temporary asylum, until 
then, had been in Africa and Asia, where war-refugees were housed in camps until they could return 
home. As it was therefore associated with the ‘third world’, the advice to implement temporary 
asylum in Western Europe came relatively unexpectedly.89 
It is interesting to see the difference between the Danish and Swedish responses to the proposal for 
temporary protection measures. The centre-right government in Denmark was quite eager to 
implement the measures, introducing a bill regarding temporary asylum for people fleeing the 
Former Yugoslavia in October 1992. Under the new law, asylum-seekers deemed in particular need of 
protection could receive temporary asylum in Denmark for six months at a time,  for up to a limit of 
two years. During this stay, their asylum applications would not be further processed, which meant 
they could not receive an official refugee status until two years had passed and if the crisis in 
Yugoslavia was not then over.90  
                                                                 
83 Folketingstidende, 1991-92, FF 8878, 
84 Borevi, ‘Sweden: The Flagship of Multiculturalism’, p. 59-60. 
85 SOU 1991: 1, p. 22-23; Prot. 1991/92: 49.  
86 SOU 1992: 133, p. 22. 
87 UNHCR, ‘Report of the International Meeting on Humanitarian Aid to Victims of the Conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia’. 
88 UNHCR, ‘A Comprehensive Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in the former Yugoslavia ’. 
89 See, for example, Folketingstidende 1994-95, FF 1480-1481. 
90 Lov 933, 28-11-1992.  
 
20 
In Sweden, on the other hand, the government still decided against implementing temporary asylum 
for Bosnian asylum-seekers at this point. As mentioned earlier, the measure was deemed inhumane 
for people who fled crisis situations without a clear prospect of rapid improvement, and could 
therefore establish significant ties to Sweden. In fact, while Sweden did apply certain temporary 
asylum measures in 1993, the Bosnian case was given as just such an example of a protracted crisis in 
which temporary asylum did not apply.91 In that sense, the Swedish stance was framed through a 
notion of ‘humanitarianism’. While restricting immigration could lessen the burden on the national 
asylum system, the emotional wellbeing of the asylum-seekers was also taken into account. I would 
also argue that the generous asylum system for Bosnians could be seen as an extension of the 
generous immigration rules that lent Sweden its reputation of humanitarianism throughout the Cold 
War. 
Interestingly enough, the implementation of temporary protection in Denmark was also legitimised 
through a humanitarian lens. The government’s reasoning was, under reported advice from the UN, 
that permanent asylum would in fact facilitate ethnic cleansing in Bosnia by motivating people to 
leave their country and not return in the future.92 Furthermore, they argued that money spent 
towards establishing protection in the region would be much more (cost-)effective than taking in 
long-term refugees.93 Though the centre-right government was also adamant that Denmark had a 
duty to protect asylum-seekers, the crisis in Yugoslavia should not be turned into a permanent 
refugee situation in Denmark.94 
On the other hand, when a Danish Social-Democratic government decided to start processing the 
Bosnian asylum-applications after the two-year term was up in 1994, they also framed their decision 
through humanitarian arguments. Similarly to the Swedish arguments to not implement temporary 
protection, the government argued that indefinite temporary asylum would be both undesirable and 
inhumane.95 Interestingly enough, the centre-right opposition responded by echoing the arguments 
that temporary asylum was actually the more humanitarian choice, as it prevented the situation in 
Yugoslavia from becoming a permanent refugee situation and the aid was best spent in the region 
anyway.96 
This use of humanitarian arguments to argue for both sides of the ‘temporary asylum de bate’ is in 
line with Didier Fassin’s notion of ‘humanitarian government’. Through that concept, he argues that 
appeals to emotional sentiments are increasingly used by governments to legitimise their actions, 
but that those can also be applied to a whole range of (contrasting) policy measures.97 In this case, 
both border restrictions and openness are framed through a measure of humanitarianism and 
morality. 
3.4. Media Influences 
Although Bosnian asylum-seekers were seen as too vulnerable a population to warrant temporary 
asylum, the Swedish government did implement immigration restrictions in 1992, in the form of visa-
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requirements for Yugoslav citizens. The situation in Serbia-Montenegro was simply not deemed 
dangerous enough to warrant a blanket visa-waver, as opposed to the Bosnian case.98 
The degree to which asylum-seekers were actually in need of protection was, as described earlier, a 
major influence on the debates regarding the implementation of temporary protection in both 
Denmark and Sweden. These kinds of debates regarding the ‘realness’ of refugees were not new in 
either country, and had existed in both the public and political spheres since at least since the fall of 
the Iron Curtain.99 The political debates about protection for asylum-seekers should therefore not be 
seen as separated from the public (media) debates regarding refugees.  
John Aggergaard Larsen, for example, describes how a debate took place in the Danish media 
regarding the ‘realness’ of refugees. This debate was sparked by images of we ll-dressed and well-fed 
refugees in Danish asylum-seeker centres, as well as by stereotypes regarding the ‘criminality’ of 
certain groups of refugees. 100 Bosnians were generally perceived as ‘real’ refugees,  however, 
because of the media coverage of the atrocities that were being committed in the country and the 
associations those evoked with Danish suffering during the Second World War. 101 These associations 
with Danes also helped downplay the fact that many of the refugees were Bosniaks, Bosnian Muslims. 
Their (imagined) similarities with an episode of Danish history also helped frame their religion as a 
minor part of their identity, and their religiousness as ‘just like Danes are nominally Christians’.102 In 
that sense, the relative absence of ‘cultural tension’  arguments could also be seen in the light of 
these perceived similarities. 
A similar debate about ‘refugee-realness’ took place in Sweden, but the debate there focused on 
whether the situation for Kosovars was pressing enough to warrant visa-free travel.103 The 
aforementioned implementation of visa-requirements shows that that was not the case. 
The influence of the media on national decision-making processes also extended to the possibility of 
provoking national political debates. When the two-year term for the freezing of Bosnian asylum 
cases in Denmark was up in 1994, several mayors (from across the political spectrum) expressed their 
concerns in national newspapers regarding the possibility of the arrival of such a large number of 
refugees within society. The themes they raised focused on relatively pragmatic issues, like the 
possibility of housing shortages, welfare costs and job prospects. 104 However, despite the relative 
lack of arguments relating to ethnic tensions in the national border policy debates, these local 
politicians also often cited fears of increasing tensions and the possible ‘ghettoisation’ of Danish 
cities.105 
The influence of local politics on national policy-making extended outside the ‘media-arena’ in 
Sweden, as the municipalities there had much greater autonomy in, for example, deciding to allow 
refugees to be resettled within their community.106 While the Danish mayors mostly caused a public 
debate through their media-appearances, the possible outright refusal of Swedish municipal 
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politicians to take in refugees allowed them a much greater influence on national policy-making.107 
This was regardless of their appearance in the media, although the public arguments that they gave 
were quite similar to the Danish ones, in that they for example focused more heavily on economic 
matters. It also became clear that many municipalities instead chose to focus on the positive 
economic effects that refugees could have, such as filling unoccupied housing.108  
It is interesting to note the difference in framings that were being used for the ‘local’ and ‘national’ 
levels of the asylum-debate. As I showed earlier, notions like ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘protection 
needs’ appeared prevalent in the debates at a national level, while more pragmatic arguments were 
dominant at a local level, although this was also influenced by the ‘asylum stage’ that both levels 
dealt with. When the decision for temporary asylum was made in Denmark, there was a reasonable 
chance that asylum-seekers would not ‘enter society proper’ as they might be sent back within two 
years. Issues of job security and welfare costs were therefore not yet really at hand. When the end -
term of the border-restrictiveness neared, it was also municipal politicians who would sooner see the 
effects that refugees could have on their local resources. As I will show in the next chapter, 
arguments regarding the economic and cultural issues arising from immigration also become more 
prevalent on the national level when it became clear that a large number of asylum-seekers would 
stay in Denmark, and the issue of integration policy was discussed.  
It is difficult to say to what degree the criticism of local politicians influenced the policy-making 
process at a national level. However, the debates in newspapers and other national media were 
occasionally used in parliament to, among other things, legitimise criticism by and of the opposition 
parties and as a reason for demanding lengthy debates about a certain issue. 109 The concerns of local 
politicians were therefore at least visible at a national level. 
3.5. Internationalisation and Burden-Sharing 
The ‘temporary protection advice’ that the UNHCR gave in 1992 would be the start of an increasing 
internationalisation of the refugee question. For example, when Sweden implemented visa-
requirements for Yugoslavs, this decision was made after deliberation with the other Nordic 
countries, and Denmark implemented similar requirements for persons from Serbia, Montenegro 
and Macedonia around the same time.110 
As the crisis in Yugoslavia progressed, international burden-sharing would also increasingly be used 
to legitimise restrictive national asylum policies. After the amount of asylum-applications in Sweden 
increased dramatically over the course of 1992 and early 1993, the Swedish government felt itself 
forced to extend visa-requirements to Bosnian asylum-seekers as well. When the decision was 
announced, about 65,000 asylum-seekers were still waiting on a decision regarding their asylum-
application, and another 90,000 were waiting for their assigned housing.111 In terms of resources and 
capacity, the Swedish asylum system seemed to be reaching its limits. The restrictive policy of other 
European countries, and therefore their negligence in terms of burden-sharing, was cited as making 
it impossible for Sweden to maintain a generous border policy.112 Denmark followed suit two days 
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later, arguing that the Swedish policy would cause even further pressures on the Danish asylum 
system if it had not done so.113  
Besides blaming other countries for not fulfilling their burden-sharing duties, the earlier mentioned 
humanitarian arguments were also used to legitimise both countries’ turn towards restrictiveness. 
The UNHCR’s and the Danish argument that generous refugee policies contributed to the ethnic 
cleansing efforts in Yugoslavia were now also echoed by Sweden,114 although they still argued against 
the implementation of temporary asylum for Bosnians, because of the reasons cited earlier. 115 
Furthermore, the government also granted all Bosnian asylum-seekers present in the country before 
the restrictions were enforced a blanket permanent residence permit.116 In Denmark, the restrictive 
turn was also framed through a humanitarian protection lens, with the argument that visa-
requirements would allow the government to ‘invite’ those persons who were most in need of 
protection.117 
The remarks by both Sweden and Denmark regarding the implementation of visa-requirements 
should in my opinion also be seen as a sign that both countries wanted to focus more heavily on 
international burden-sharing. In their press release on those measures in Sweden, the Swedish 
Minister for Migration summarised it by remarking that ‘Sweden could not solve the world’s 
problems on its own’.118 Similar remarks were made in the Danish parliament, where the government 
stated that it was due to the fact that other countries did not follow the UNHCR’s advice for 
temporary asylum that the asylum systems like the Swedish one were in ‘total collapse’.119 
The implementation of visa-requirements in both countries was paired with greater investments in 
refugee camps and immigration offices in safe third countries within the general Balkan area. The 
idea was that Danish and Swedish immigration officials could then select those people most in need 
and grant them a visa.120 In that sense, the earlier ‘protection’ arguments were fulfilled. However, as 
Abiri notes, this emphasis on ‘protection needs’ was also inspired by the Danish and Swedish insights 
that asylum-seekers often travelled through several other safe countries before arriving in 
Scandinavia.121 The Danish-Swedish agreement to implement visa-restrictions was therefore also 
presented by both governments as a sign to these third countries (and the rest of Europe) of a desire 
to implement a common European approach to refugee issues.122 Despite this justification, the move 
was also criticised by organisations like the UNHCR and Amnesty International as an unnecessary 
hardening of the border.  123 
The move towards remote immigration offices within the Balkan regions could also be viewed as a 
form of ‘remote policing’ of potential refugees. Institutions like consulates and embassies were 
thereby used to keep out ‘unwanted’ asylum-seekers by refusing them a visa.124 When the Bosnian 
refugee crisis started, the processing of asylum cases was seen as one of the most costly components 
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of the Danish and Swedish asylum systems.125 By setting up remote immigration offices, apart from 
the humanitarian arguments above, both states therefore also gained the ability to keep out those 
whose asylum-applications would be rejected either way, and would therefore place an ‘unnecessary’ 
burden on the state’s resources. 
Hopes for (regional) burden-sharing were also echoed on a broader European Union context (which 
Sweden would join in 1995). In 1994, Germany (which had in absolute numbers taken in more 
refugees during this period than Sweden and Denmark combined)126 for example used its EU-
Presidency to introduce a Draft Council Resolution on Burden-Sharing, which would distribute 
asylum-seekers among the member states, which both Denmark and Sweden supported.127 However, 
opposition from countries like the UK and France would prevent it from gaining majority support , 
although the French Presidency of 1995 would eventually see a watered-down version of the policy 
implemented.128  
The reasons for an increasing focus on burden-sharing, as posited here, in my opinion fit 
Thielemann’s model in which cost-benefit and norm-based motivations play a role.129 As mentioned 
earlier, the internationalisation of the response towards refugees from Yugoslavia allowed states to 
cut costs in their asylum systems by pre-emptively keeping out ‘improper’ refugees. On the other 
hand, the objections that both Sweden and Denmark showed towards restrictive border practices, or 
rejection of certain policy advice abroad could also be seen as a way to enforce a certain norm of 
burden-sharing on the rest of Europe. The undertone of their objections thereby was that they were 
unjustly disadvantaged by the amount of refugees that supposedly made their way to Scandinavia 
because of other states’ policies.  
3.6. Conclusion 
Comparing the restrictiveness of the Danish and Swedish border policy in the early 1990s, there are 
more similarities than differences to be found. Under pressure from the continuing ref ugee crisis in 
Yugoslavia, for example, both countries externalised their immigration procedures through the 
establishment of immigration offices within the Balkan region. On the one hand, this was motivated 
by the sheer scale of the crisis and the amount of refugees that subsequently made their way 
towards Scandinavia, nearly overwhelming both countries' asylum systems. On the other hand, this 
move towards restrictiveness also appeared to be a question of resources, in terms of states’ 
capacity to take in asylum-seekers. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this included the rising cost 
of the processing and reception of asylum-seekers, but also related to issues such as ‘questions of 
space’ and the logistics of housing refugees. The implementation of ‘remote policing’ practices could 
also be viewed through this economic lens.130 However, while economics played a large role in the 
choices regarding border-restrictiveness, these issues were also often framed through notions of 
‘humanitarianism’, though, as Fassin’s concept of ‘humanitarian government’ or ‘humanitarian 
reason’ shows,131 these kinds of arguments can be used to frame and legitimise a range of 
(conflicting) policy-measures. 
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Throughout the crisis, the importance of looking at the influence of international politics on national-
policy-making also became increasingly clear. Advice from international organisations like the UNHCR 
was for example reflected in the policy and discourse of both the Danish and Swedish parliaments. 
Notions of international burden-sharing lay at the basis of many of the restrictive measures that 
were put in place, often after certain degrees of international deliberation. Using Thielemann’s 
model of motivations for international burden-sharing, the ‘norm-based’ notion that no state should 
carry an undue burden, or the ‘cost-benefits’ of remote policing, were reflected in the move towards 
burden-sharing during this period.132   
As showed through the example of municipal objections to the arrival of refugees, it is also important 
to consider the influence of local politics on national policy-making. I will show in the next chapter 
that this became especially relevant when discussing changes to integration policies. As temporary 
asylum meant that it was plausible that many asylum-seekers would never enter ‘society proper’, the 
impact on local communities was not yet of the same political magnitude as it would become during 
the integration debates, when it became clear that many people did stay. While my thesis focuses 
predominantly on national policy-making, the influence of all other spheres of politics, both local and 
international, and the public sphere and the media, are also important to take into account.  
The implementation of temporary asylum was also the main difference between the Danish and the 
Swedish responses to the Bosnian refugee crisis. While Sweden refused to implement temporary 
asylum for Bosnians, Denmark was relatively quick in doing so. As I argued earlier in this chapter, the 
notions of both economics and humanitarianism seemed to play a large role in explaining this 
difference. Sweden argued for abstaining from temporary asylum because it was deemed inhumane 
to leave people in indefinite uncertainty, which was also a reason for the Danish Social Democrats to 
start processing Bosnian asylum cases again. Furthermore, the country already had a history of 
humanitarianism in relation to open immigration schemes. On the other hand, the implementation 
of temporary asylum in Denmark was also legitimised through humanitarian arguments, as it was for 
example argued that this freed up resources that could be spent (much more effectively) within the 
region, to help the most vulnerable. 
When discussing the difference in border policy of the two countries, it is also important to loo k at 
the relative influence of anti-immigration parties on national policy-making. New Democracy in 
Sweden was, for example, a large reason for the government’s pro-refugee stance. However, the 
Progress Party, Denmark’s anti-immigration party, seemed to have little influence during this period, 
by comparison. In chapter five, I will go into greater detail about why anti -immigration had varying 
degrees of success and influence in both countries. 
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Chapter 4: Integration Policy 
When Yugoslavia disintegrated, and large amounts of asylum-seekers made their way towards 
Scandinavia, the openness of the border and the reception-capacity of the asylum systems was 
increasingly debated. In Denmark especially, which implemented temporary asylum measures, the 
question of integration seemed less contested. With large numbers of asylum-seekers expected to 
return home after a short while, their reception and temporary accommodation seemed more 
pressing.  
For both Denmark and Sweden, the events of the early 1990s would gradually change their political 
discourse on refugees, and the ideas regarding their need for integration. In this chapter, I will 
describe and explain the different choices both countries made with regards to their integration 
policy throughout the 1990s. I will thereby firstly explain the impact that the economic crisis in the 
early 1990s had on the (perceived) need to connect immigrants to the national labour markets. 
Afterwards, I will explain the reasons for the different degrees of emphasis on cultural integration 
within the Danish and Swedish integration policies, specifically why Denmark took a much stronger 
cultural integrationist turn than Sweden.  
4.1. Labour Market Integration 
I explained in the previous chapter that the asylum debates in the early 1990s were partially framed 
as questions of limited resources. I would argue that it is therefore firstly important to look at the 
influence that the economic recession of the early 1990s had when discussing integration policy, 
especially since it grew into a full-blown economic crisis in Sweden.133 The different impacts that this 
trend had on the national economies of both countries becomes clear through their unemployment 
rates throughout the 1990s. While the Danish unemployment rate rose significantly between 1990 
and 1993, the Swedish one showed an especially marked growth.  
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Ill. 3 Unemployed percentage of the workforce in Denmark and Sweden, 1989-2001. 
Sources: Statistics Denmark, Statistics Sweden. 
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The economic recession heavily influenced the integration debates of both countries. Though 
economics influences almost all aspects of asylum policy, integration policy at this time was 
especially linked to economic issues. While the general unemployment rates of both countries were 
high, reports showed that there was a significant difference between the labour market participation 
of refugees and ‘native’ Danes or Swedes.134 Partially due to this ‘disconnect’ with the labour market, 
and therefore a greater reliance on welfare benefits, refugees and immigrants were seen as bringing 
greater costs to their national welfare states.135 
In both countries, the political reaction to these reports was to implement policy aimed at 
connecting immigrants and refugees to the labour market, or at least lessening the economic impact 
of unemployment. In Sweden, this meant that asylum-seekers had to start ‘meaningful’ activities 
from the moment they lived in an asylum-seeker centre. While the government acknowledged that it 
was difficult for them to find ‘real’ work, these asylum-seekers were at least expected to start 
learning the Swedish language or vocational skills, or to help maintain and clean thei r temporary 
accommodation.136 These measures were presented as an obligation for asylum-seekers, and 
included possible repercussions for the allowances that they received, should they not participate in 
those activities.137 Borevi argues that the measures were also a sign towards the Swedish electorate 
that asylum-seekers, like everyone in Sweden, had to contribute to society instead of just ‘creaming 
off’ social benefits.138 In that sense, it also shows how integration policy, like the border policy 
described in the previous chapter, can also have a ‘discursive’ element or creates a ‘spectacle’ 
through which the government sends signals to relevant social groups.139 
In Denmark too, participation in the labour market was framed as an obligation towards the welfare 
state.140 However, in comparison with Sweden, asylum-seekers, refugees and immigrants were not 
necessarily seen as a group in need of a specific policy. Instead, the government’s reforms were 
aimed at every individual receiving welfare benefits who could, in theory, find gainful employment.141 
The measures in Denmark were quite comparable to the Swedish ones, as the emphasis lay on job 
training and education in order to overcome people’s disconnect to the labour market. If these 
measures were unsuccessful, the welfare benefits would be cut after a set amount of years.142 
This emphasis on ‘activation’ and active participation in the workforce as an obligation towards the 
state falls within the general notion of a ‘workline’ within the welfare state, whereby the primary 
focus lies on guiding people towards work instead of merely providing welfare benefits.143 The 
workline could be seen as an integral part of the Scandinavian universalistic welfare states, as the 
model presupposes that everyone contributes to it according to their capacity.144 However, the 
balance between an emphasis on the rights (to welfare benefits) and the duties (to contribute) of the 
welfare state, tends to fluctuate over time. For example, Halvorsen and Jensen argue that the 
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requirements to receive welfare benefits tend to be more lenient in periods of low unemployment, 
and vice versa. It is therefore debateable to what degree the turn towards ‘activation’ in the early 
1990s constituted a dramatic change by comparison to earlier welfare (integration) policies.145 
The above policy focused heavily on the individual agency of migrants, but other policies were 
introduced around the same time to address issues within the broader economic structure. In both 
Denmark and Sweden, these policies focused on issues like combatting ethnic discrimination in the 
labour market, or addressing gender issues that might cause ‘barriers’ for women wanting to enter 
the workforce.146  
While the policy in the middle of the 1990s emphasised individual agency, the general discourse 
regarding immigrants and refugees in both countries often singled them out as particularly 
problematic groups in terms of their connection to the labour market. This was especially deemed to 
be the case in Sweden, where the government followed an explicit multicultural immigration 
policy.147 Policy was thereby made for whole groups of immigrants. From a policy perspective, 
however, the problem was that ‘immigrants’ were not a homogeneous group, but that the category 
had people from completely different backgrounds collected within it.148 The emphasis within the 
Swedish policy of 1997 therefore shifted from a collective ‘immigrant’ group towards the individual 
needs and ‘shortcomings’ of persons, regardless of their country of origin.  As Hall and Lamont argue, 
this turn towards individual economic self-reliability could also be seen as an example of increasing 
neoliberal influences on welfare state policy.149 In theory, this individualist turn meant that (after a 
brief introduction period) no real distinction was made between ‘Swedes’ and refugees within the 
integration policy.150 Nevertheless, in practice, government officials and policy-makers still often 
formulated policy for immigrant ‘categories’ instead of individual persons.151 
I mentioned earlier that this turn towards individualism was already present in the Danish labour 
policy of the early 1990s. The official policy was one whereby immigrants, in theory, had access to 
social amenities and the labour market ‘on the same footing’ as the general Danish population. 152 
However, the integration policy of 1998 would focus more heavily on the (perceived) shortcomings 
of immigrants as a particular group. Whereas the earlier policy grouped together both Danes and 
refugees in terms of their lack of, for example, labour market integration, the white paper for the 
1998 Integration Act focused exclusively on refugees and immigrants.153 In contrast to Sweden, the 
Danish policy thereby took a marked turn towards cultural integration, as I will explain in the next 
part of this chapter. It is important to note that the ‘re-categorisation’ of immigrants as a specific 
group did not mean that the Danish policy contained less of an individualistic approach than the 
Swedish one, as it also heavily focused on, for example, the individual ‘shortcomings’ of refugees that 
prevent them from actively participating in the labour market.  
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As with earlier policy, the Danish Integration Act of 1998 included a heavy focus on ‘activation’ in 
relation to labour market issues. Similar to the policy of the early 1990s, an emphasis was placed on 
the ‘obligation’ that refugees had in terms of participation in the labour market, or in education that 
could prepare them for gainful employment. Failure to do so had implications for their ‘rights’ within 
the welfare state, in the form of cuts to their introduction benefits.154 In that sense, I would argue 
that the labour focus of the Integration Act was a continuation of the earlier ‘workline’, that is seen 
as an integral part of the Scandinavian universalistic welfare model.155 
It can be argued that the universalistic foundations of the Scandinavian welfare model heavily 
influenced the policy-decision whether or not to focus on immigrants as a separate group within 
society. References to the ‘Swedish’ welfare model were made by Swedish political parties when 
arguing for the necessity of an individual welfare focus.156 Similarly, in Denmark debates had been 
going on about the implementation of a comprehensive integration policy since the early 1970s. 
However, governments usually hesitated to formulate policy specifically targeting immigrants as a 
separate group within society, as this would not fit within the Danish universalist welfare model.157 
The increasing focus on individual agency and obligations, instead of policy focused on collective 
categories, within the Danish and Swedish integration policies can also be seen within a broader 
context of increasing neoliberal influences on national welfare states. Kymlicka, for example, argues 
that neoliberal integration and education policy often focuses on creating economically successful 
individuals.158 Eastmond thereby addresses the seemingly paradoxical idea behind neoliberal 
integration policy that, in order to promote individual responsibility and self -sufficiently, states 
increasingly intervene in the lives of immigrants through integration policies.159  
Increasing neoliberalist influences can also partially explain the changing opinions of refugees that I 
am describing in this chapter. For example, Kymlicka argues that people might become more welfare 
chauvinist when economies and labour markets change due to globalisation. 160 Though the welfare 
state itself is not criticized, its openness towards ‘outsiders’ could be if immigrants are seen as a 
particular drain on the welfare state. The solidarity that lies at the basis of the welfare state then 
becomes  what Kymlicka calls ‘solidarity without inclusivity’, whereby groups within society, but 
outside the imagined community, are excluded from the welfare state.161 Under this discourse, 
refugees could also be framed as an ‘economic threat’ to an already changing (increasingly neoliberal) 
labour market.162 The earlier discursive elements to both countries’ activation policies, like signalling 
that refugees were not (necessarily) ‘creaming off welfare’, could in my opinion also be seen as 
measures against this notion of refugees as an economic ‘threat’ to the welfare state.  
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4.2. Cultural Integration 
One of the primary objectives of the Danish and Swedish integration policies over the course o f the 
1990s was connecting immigrants, and other ‘problematic’ groups within society, to the labour 
market. As I mentioned earlier, high unemployment rates and increasing costs to the welfare state 
were some of the main reasons for changes within integration policy. However, the perceived 
importance of labour market integration stretched beyond purely economic motivations. In both 
countries, participation in the labour market was also seen as a way to promote social integration 
within broader society. The idea was that having a job prevented refugees from falling into social 
isolation or marginalisation, besides the psychological and economic costs that unemployment could 
bear for both the refugee and the welfare state.163 The (perceived) disconnect between immigrants 
and the labour market therefore also contained a marked socio-cultural dimension, as 
unemployment was seen as an obstruction to integration. 
In the previous part, I showed that there were some differences between the Danish and Swedish 
labour market integration policies, for example in relation to their emphasis on individual needs or 
generalised ‘refugee’ categories. Nonetheless, in general, there were many similarities to be found, 
like the increasing (neoliberal) focus on individual obligations and rights. The economic impact of 
unemployed immigrants and the economic crisis thereby prompted both countries to change their 
integration policies. Besides labour market integration, however, the Danish policy of 1998 was also 
different from the Swedish one because it placed a much heavier focus on ‘cultural’ integration. 
Before the 1998 Integration Act, the Danish integration policy was a de facto multicultural one. Equal 
opportunities were promoted, for example in terms of economic opportunities, but an emphasis was 
also placed on the possibilities for immigrants to maintain their own cultural backgrounds. 164 
Under the Integration Act, this emphasis on refugees’ own cultural background was still present, but 
it now also included an emphasis on the duty that refugees had to take part in mandatory integration 
programmes.165 These programmes, besides the earlier mentioned labour market focus, also placed a 
heavy emphasis on issues like ‘knowledge of various aspects of Danish society’. 166 The fact that 
integration and contribution to society was now perceived as a duty for the refugee was emphasised 
in the Integration Act, which stated that refugees could lose their introduction benefits if they either 
refused to participate in the introduction programme or turned down a job offer without good 
reason.167  
To a certain degree, the emphasis on ‘cultural skills’ falls within the earlier described broader 
Scandinavian focus on the ‘workline’ within the welfare state. In Sweden as well, for example, a 
certain degree of knowledge regarding the national language and ‘culture’ was often seen as 
necessary to improve a refugee’s chance of employment.168 The Danish focus, however, was more 
controversial, due to the linkages between integration and introduction benefits. The introduction 
benefit was introduced in the Integration Act and entailed that immigrants and refugees within the 
integration programmes received social welfare on a substantially lower level than Danish nationals. 
Implicitly, this pointed towards a categorisation of immigrants as ‘second-class citizens’.169 
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Furthermore, this distinction between refugees and ‘natives’ was possibly in breach of the UN 
Refugee Convention.170 The introduction benefits were therefore abolished again after a few months.  
The benefits were not necessarily a Danish innovation. Sweden implemented a similar policy in 1993, 
though that was framed as an ‘introduction allowance’. The Swedish idea was quite similar, in that it 
entailed possible welfare cuts for refugees who did not participate in i ntroduction programmes to a 
satisfactory degree.171 However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the Swedish municipalities 
had relatively extensive autonomy in deciding whether or not to implement immigration policy. Due 
to unclear guidelines and few ways for the national government to enforce local policy, most 
municipalities chose not to implement the allowances.172   
Though the introduction benefits were only present temporarily, I include them in this chapter 
because they are part of a move towards an increasing differentiation between Danes and refugees 
in the Danish welfare state. By comparison, I started this chapter with a description of the labour 
policy of the early 1990s, where no such distinction was present. Furthermore, the  controversial 
policy was implemented by a Social Democratic government that, during the Bosnian Crisis, was 
much more permissive in terms of integration. The Social Democrats, for example, advocated for the 
integration of Bosnians within Denmark, instead of sending them back after the crisis in Yugoslavia 
had run its course.173 
One of the reasons for this turn towards restrictiveness was the increasing media attention on 
integration and welfare issues during the second half of the 1990s. In 1997, the tabloid Ekstra Bladet 
ran a large campaign against (supposed) welfare misuse by immigrants. One of the main arguments 
of the newspaper was that the allowances for refugees were too high, and promoted both 
immigration towards Denmark and continued unemployment for immigrants who had al ready 
arrived.174 The campaign caused quite a stir within the Danish public debate, and was later used by 
the government to legitimise the reduced welfare payments of the introduction benefits. 175 
At the same time, the emergence of the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party also caused quite a 
stir within the political sphere. Though only founded in 1995 (after separating from the anti -
immigration Progress Party), the party quickly gained popularity. The Danish People’s Party joined 
the centre-right Liberal Party in criticising the government’s asylum policy, which led to a decline in 
the Social-Democrats’ popularity.176 As a result, some authors argue that the Social-Democratic 
government turned towards a more restrictive (integration) policy, in the hope of curb ing the right-
wing parties’ growing popularity.177 However, I will leave a more detailed explanation of the impact 
of anti-immigration parties on national political cultures for the next chapter.  
Returning to the ‘rights and obligations’ dichotomy that I referenced earlier, the initial 
implementation of introduction benefits in Denmark signalled that refugees had a greater obligation 
under the Danish asylum system to adhere to the requirements of the introduction programmes – 
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compared to Sweden, at least, especially given the practical non-enforcement of the Swedish 
introduction allowances. I would thereby argue that the Danish government also used the 
(controversial) restrictiveness of the integration policy as a ‘discursive policy’, to respond towards 
criticism regarding the permissiveness of the previous asylum policy.178 The focus on ‘cultural 
knowledge’ should thereby also be seen within the broader, public immigration debate. Lise Togeby, 
for example, shows that problems arising from ‘cultural differences’ between immigrants and ‘native’ 
Danes received increasing media coverage in the second half of the 1990s. 179  
In Sweden, by comparison, the socio-cultural cleavage was much less politicised at the time.180 As a 
matter of fact, while the dichotomy between ‘immigrant groups’ and ‘natives’ seemed increasingly 
politicised in Denmark, the Swedish integration policy sought to turn away from the ‘immigrant’ 
category altogether.181 While authors like Steffen Jöhncke argue that the Danish rhetoric of ‘putting 
refugees on an equal footing with Danes’ in practice meant that refugees had to ‘turn Danish’;182 the 
Swedish government took a stance that the notion of ‘normal Swedishness’ should be altered to 
include both ‘native Swedes’ and the now (in theory) outdated category of ‘immigrants’.183 
4.3. State Intervention in Private Lives 
It could be argued that a certain degree of national solidarity is a prerequisite for the Scandinavian 
universalist welfare model.184 In practice, this model presupposes a degree of conformity to certai n 
national values among the citizens of the welfare state, like solidarity, which can be guaranteed 
through certain state interventions in the private lives of citizens.185 The integration packages of both 
Sweden and Denmark in the 1990s also contained these types of interventions, in the form of 
dispersal policies and changes to family unification laws. 
The Danish Integration Act of 1998 included provisions for dispersing newly-arrived refugees 
throughout almost all municipalities across the country.186 The previous policy allocated social 
housing within the Danish urban centres to refugees. On the other hand, the new policy was 
specifically aimed at both fostering integration by placing refugees in ‘mainstream’ Danish society 
within both cities and villages, and preventing the formation of ‘ethnic ghettoes’ within the cities.187 
Larsen notes that a lot of the rural municipalities had fewer possibilities for employment than the 
urban centres. However, refugees were not allowed to move away from their assigned hous ing for a 
set amount of time. Therefore, she argues, the government simultaneously kept reinforcing a 
‘workline’ discourse, while also limiting the employment chances of refugees. 188 
With regard to the presence of anti-immigration sentiment within society, it could be argued that an 
unfamiliarity with certain immigrant groups creates (unfounded) fears such as the ‘cultural threats’ I 
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discussed earlier. While it is difficult to estimate the impact of the Danish dispersal policy on public 
sentiments regarding immigrant groups, the presence of refugees within an increasing number of 
municipalities could be expected to impact public opinions. However, it appears as if there was little 
correlation between the two, as the presence of anti-immigration sentiment within society did not 
significantly change after the implementation of the policy.189 
The situation in Sweden was somewhat different, as refugees had much greater freedom to arrange 
their own accommodation. During the ‘activation’ reforms of the early 1990s, the  government 
decided to also implement a system where refugees had the choice (if they were able to) to find their 
own accommodation outside of the refugee centres or state-provided housing.190 From an ‘activation’ 
point of view, the possibility to find their own housing reduced the possibility of refugees becoming 
‘passive’ in the refugee centres.191 The so-called ‘own accommodation’ (eget boende, or ebo) policy 
also had implications for (later) integration policy. As mentioned earlier, the local municipalities  had 
extensive autonomy in determining which types of allowances refugees had access to, but also to a 
certain degree what the content of local integration programmes was. If refugees were therefore 
free to find their own housing, they could also make choices regarding the extensiveness of, for 
example, language courses and labour market integration schemes.192 In that sense, the policy was in 
line with the overall turn towards ‘activation’ during the 1990s, as it meant an increasing focus on 
the individual responsibilities of refugees within their own integration trajectories and the broader 
society and economy.193 
As mentioned earlier, one of the main reasons behind the Danish dispersal policy was a fear of 
‘ethnic ghettoes’ forming within the country’s urban centres.194 The possibility of refugees and 
immigrants clustering together in certain areas of Sweden was also acknowledged by Swedish policy -
makers, but was deemed less problematic than in Denmark. Their argument was that ethnic tensions 
and the like would probably not rise, as those areas already had a high percentage of immigration 
either way, and such areas were not deemed a negative influence on the refugee’s integration 
chances.195 Borevi thereby argues that the expected benefits of prompting refugees to ‘help 
themselves’ within the welfare state outweighed the possible drawbacks of the policy. 196 
The differences in dispersal or housing policy between the two countries fall in line with their 
different foci on cultural integration. The fear of ‘ethnic ghettoes’ within the Danish Integration Act 
of 1998 contrasts sharply with the Swedish intention to focus less on a dichotomy of ‘natives’ versus 
‘immigrants’. This falls in line with the aforementioned increasing politicisation of the socio-cultural 
cleavage within Danish politics and society. Over the course of the 1990s, the discourse regarding 
immigrants and ‘natives’ in the Danish public and political debates increasingly focused on what 
Peter Hervik calls ‘unbridgeable cultural differences’.197 It is this ‘cultural threat’ which, I would argue, 
also explains the apparent paradoxical Danish dispersal measure that Larsen addressed: the 
obligations for refugees to find work were increasingly highlighted through ‘activation policies’, but 
dispersal could actually decrease their chances of employment.198 However, dispersal also meant 
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that fewer refugees could live in the same neighbourhoods, thereby reducing their visibility within 
the urban centres. 
Kymlicka’s notion of ‘economic’ versus ‘cultural threats’ therefore also does apply to this situation. 
Kymlicka namely argues that ‘cultural threats’ are often seen as greater dangers to a (welfare) state 
than economic pressures. It could therefore be deemed preferential to have fewer immigrants in one 
given place, even if it means that the overall economic pressure from the whole immigrant group 
increases.199 In the Danish case, the threat of ‘ethnic ghettoization’ can therefore be seen as being 
more pressing than the effects dispersal had on the welfare-dependency of refugees. Although, as I 
will explain in the next chapter, the policy can also be seen as a form of a ‘restrictiveness spectacle’ 
to appease anti-immigration parties and voters within Danish society.200 
The focus on cultural issues and ‘conformity’ in Denmark, in my opinion, became even clearer in the 
final years of the 1990s. As Jønsson and Petersen describe, for example, the concept of ‘foreignness’ 
in Denmark was expanded during this time, with the implementation of integration policies for 
second-generation immigrants as well.201 The title of the committee involved, in my opinion, shows 
the implicit discourse of cultural differences between immigrants and ‘Danes’: the Ministerial 
Committee on Integration and Maladjusted Young People (Ministerudvalget om Integration og 
Utilpassede Unge). The idea thereby seems to be that second-generation immigrants have to adjust 
to a certain degree of conformity regarding the broader Danish society, to a larger extent than 
‘native’ young people. 
As mentioned earlier, the universalist Scandinavian welfare state requires a certain degree of 
conformity among its citizens, which legitimises certain state interventions in citizens’ private lives. 202 
Besides allocating a location where refugees can live, these interventions also apply to the question 
of with whom one can live, through family unification laws. Schmidt thereby argues that the relative 
Danish restrictiveness in the Integration Act also extents to family unification. Besides discourse 
regarding the (increasing) number of immigrants that arrive under unification, she also argues that 
an explicit notion of cultural differences between immigrant groups and the general Danish 
population lay at the heart of the policy.203 She thereby gives examples of notions regarding ‘forced 
marriages’ and immigrants’ different ideas regarding gender roles as legitimisation of a restriction of 
family unification.204 The restrictions to family unification should thereby also be seen in the light of 
broader public debates at the time, which stated that, besides forming ‘ethnic ghettoes’, immigrants 
also predominantly married within their own ethnic groups.205 
Restrictions to family unification had already been implemented in Sweden as part of the Social -
Democratic border restrictions in 1996.206 However, as I mentioned in the previous chapter, these 
restrictions were predominantly legitimised through notions of ‘problems of space’ and limited 
economic resources.207 The ‘cultural turn’ that appeared in Danish policy therefore seemed 
comparatively absent within the Swedish legitimation of restrictiveness. I would thereby argue that 
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this falls within the broader policy-line of downplaying the significance of ‘ethnic ghettoization’ on 
the one hand, and a move towards the abolition of the ‘immigrant’ category on the other. 
The Danish legitimation of the family unification restrictions adheres to Mikkel Rytter’s theory of 
physical borders being used as ‘moral boundaries’. He argues that the requirements for immigration 
to and integration within Danish society reflect the perceptions that policy-makers and politicians 
have of national values and ‘culture’.208 Access to the country, or to the welfare state, can therefore 
be made difficult to people who do not fit within this notion of morality, as is shown with the family 
unification restrictions that were legitimised through an emphasis on gender roles and (presumably) 
‘forced’ marriages.  
4.4. Differences in Integration Philosophy 
In my opinion, the differences between the Danish and Swedish integration policies that I described 
above could be seen through Karen Borevi’s lens of national identity and ‘philosophies of integration’. 
In her article, Borevi explains two ideal types that represent the Swedish and Danish notions of 
integration. She argues that, in line with Schmidt’s notion of ‘conformity’, the Danish model is a 
society-centred one, whereby a certain degree of cultural homogeneity and solidarity is needed to 
sustain the national welfare state.209 I would argue that the underlying thought is best explained 
through Kymlicka’s notion of ‘solidarity without inclusiveness’.210 The welfare state could be seen as 
the achievement of (the solidarity of) the general Danish population, but the cultural diversity that 
immigration brings might undermine this notion of a homogeneous Danish society. Therefore, in 
order to mitigate cultural threats to the Danish society, immigrants have to achieve a certain level of 
‘Danishness’ before they can reap the full benefits of Danish society and the welfare state.211 
The introduction benefits that were linked to refugees’ participation in introduction programmes, 
under the Danish Integration Act of 1998, could be seen as quantifying these cultural differences. 
Since the goal of the integration programme was to ‘put refugees on an equal footing with Danes’, 
which often meant ‘turning refugees Danish’,212 this meant that refugees had less access to the 
welfare state’s benefits if they could not prove their sufficient ‘Danishness’ through the completion 
of the integration programmes.  
The Swedish integration philosophy, Borevi argues, takes an opposing view of ‘equality’ than the 
Danish one. There, she argues, it was thought that access to the welfare state will implicitly also 
promote national solidarity, which she calls a state-centred approach.213 Furthermore, whereas the 
Danish national identity seems focused on a notion of cultural homogeneity, the Swedish one seems 
more open to include diversity.214 The relatively fluid notion of Swedish national identity, from a 
political perspective, was reflected in the 1997 integration policy. In line with the government’s 
intentions to do away with the generalisation of immigrants within a general ‘immigrant’ category, 
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the government tried to revise the national identity to include the whole, diverse population of 
Sweden.215  
I would argue that ‘Danishness’ and ‘Swedishness’, with their many different interpretations across 
groups within society, are markers of a national imagined community.216 Integration programmes 
could thereby be seen as ‘politics of belonging’, that determine who is seen as part of these 
communities, but also to which degree refugees feel like they are part of those. 217 The concept of 
‘belonging’ was thereby seen differently in both communities. I would argue that ‘Danishness’ 
required an ‘active’ effort to generate feelings of belonging, by proving a certain degree of 
conformity through the completion of a (cultural) integration programme. The Swedish one, on the 
other hand, seems more ‘passive’, since it did not require a similarly large degree of con formity, but 
incorporated anyone who contributes to the (welfare) state by, for example, participating in the 
labour market. 
These different views on belonging and integration were also reflected in the countries’ citizenship 
policies. When the Swedish government wanted to revise citizenship policy in 1999, they argued 
against the implementation of, for example, language requirements, as it would prevent many 
immigrants from ever receiving citizenship, and those skills would be learned automatically over time 
either way.218 In Denmark, on the other hand, increasing citizenship requirements regarding language 
and ‘cultural’ skills have been implemented since the 1998 Integration Act.219  
The differences here could be explained through a different notion of the role citizenship plays in 
integration and politics of belonging. Borevi, for example, argues that citizenship in Sweden was not 
regarded as the ‘final goal’ of integration, but as a tool to promote further integration. The idea was, 
she argues, that citizenship opened up opportunities for immigrants to, for example, learn the 
language and engage with the rest of Swedish society, which facilitates further integration. 220 
Brochmann and Hagelund, returning to the ‘rights and obligations’ dichotomy, argue that citi zenship 
in Denmark requires active participation in Danish society and the fulfilment of obligations to the 
(welfare) state, in the form of participating in integration programmes and the labour market, before 
an immigrant can receive citizenship.221 By comparison, Swedish citizenship is therefore represented 
more as a ‘right’ for anyone living in the country (after a certain amount of time).  
As to why Sweden and Denmark took an especially different integration approach during the second 
half of the 1990s, multiple reasons can be given. As I described in this chapter, the rising 
unemployment of the early 1990s framed the immigration debates through a notion of the 
obligations that refugees have to contribute to the welfare state under a workline policy. However, in 
Denmark, a much greater focus was placed on cultural differences as decreasing refugees’ chances of 
employment, by comparison to Sweden, where the emphasis lay on language and education. 
Furthermore, the politicisation of the Danish socio-cultural cleavage created a much more permissive 
environment for what Kymlicka calls ‘solidarity without inclusivity’, whereby cultural threats to the 
welfare state were also highlighted. Lastly, as I will explain in the next chapter, the varying success of 
anti-immigration parties, and the prevalence of anti-immigration sentiments within the public 
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debates, were also instrumental in explaining the differences in strictness between the Danish and 
Swedish asylum policies.  
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Chapter 5: Political Culture and Anti-Immigration Parties 
In chapter three, I described changes that the Danish and Swedish governments made in their border 
policies from 1989 onwards, during and after the Bosnian refugee crisis. Throughout the chapter, I 
also talked about the influence that the various ideologies of political parties, both in the 
government and in the opposition, had on the national policy that was eventually implemented. The 
decision to overturn the Swedish ‘Lucia Decision’ was for example, heavily infl uenced by the 
formation and growing popularity of the anti-immigration New Democracy Party as well as by the 
need for the Swedish immigration-sceptic Moderate Party to cooperate with the pro-immigration 
Liberal Party. In this chapter, I therefore want to examine the political culture of Denmark and 
Sweden further, and focus on the influence that the various parties had on changes in the national 
asylum policy. 
I will begin this chapter with an explanation of the sudden, unexpected rise of the New Democracy 
party in Sweden, which I will compare to the niche that the Progress Party occupied in Danish politics. 
Subsequently, I will explain why both New Democracy and the Progress Party failed around the 
middle of the 1990s. I will then focus on the rising popularity of the Danish People’s Party after 1995, 
and explore the reasons for the absence of viable Swedish anti -immigration parties at this time. 
Lastly, I will describe the ways in which anti-immigration parties impacted the political culture of 
‘mainstream’ parties in both countries.   
5.1. The Rise of New Democracy in Sweden 
The run-up to the 1991 election is an interesting period with regard to changes in the Swedish 
political landscape. Officially founded barely seven months before the election, the populist New 
Democracy party nonetheless was expected to win approximately 12 percent of the vote.222 Because 
of the party’s anti-establishment, anti-immigration focus, it was not really a surprise that the 
‘established’ parties were not in favour of New Democracy  entering parliament.  
The question first, however, is why New Democracy could (in theory) mobilise such a large portion of 
the electorate in the first place. As I mentioned in chapter three, Sweden’s international image in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s was still one that was focused on international humanitarianism and a 
reputation for defending human rights, with relatively open immigration schemes to accompany it, 
although the restrictive policy discussed in the Lucia Decision sought to change this image to a 
certain degree.223 This idea of humanitarianism and a generous immigration system was also 
reflected in the policy of the Swedish political parties, through a general consensus on the role of 
Sweden as a refugee-receiving country.224 With this political climate and historical reputation, New 
Democracy seemed a political outlier. 
Taking a look at the political opportunity structures that enabled its relative success, it could be 
argued that New Democracy’s outsider status also fed its popularity.225 During the run-ups to the 
1991 election, opinion polls suggested that about 61% of the Swedish electorate thought too many 
immigrants were arriving in Sweden.226 During this time, both the Social Democrats and the 
Moderate Party advocated immigration restrictions (as described in chapter three) that could have 
appealed to this group of voters. However, I would argue that the underlying pro-immigration ideals 
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of both parties made them lose their attractiveness towards the group of voters who harboured 
stricter anti-immigration sentiments, as opposed to the ones in favour of mere immigration 
restrictions. The explicit anti-immigration stance and anti-immigrant rhetoric that New Democracy 
took therefore enabled them to carve out a niche for themselves within the political landscape.227  
Anti-immigration policy, while controversial, is not the only reason that can be given for the rising 
popularity of New Democracy. As David Art asks: if immigration was the main issue that caused the 
success of New Democracy, why did no other successful anti-immigration party pop up before the 
1990s?228 Jens Rydgren argues that the party’s economic policies, and the intention to for example 
reduce welfare provisions, fitted a general political and electoral trend towards neoliberal policies 
from the 1980s onwards.229 This neoliberal trend meant that the Swedish economy and labour 
market had changed throughout the 1980s, resulting in increasing unhappiness as jobs in sectors 
such as the manufacturing industry disappeared.230 Furthermore, the rise of New Democracy 
coincided with the Swedish economic crisis of the early 1990s, during which unemployment rapidly 
rose. Economic protests and debates were not new in Swedish politics, but New Democracy 
managed to introduce an ethnic dimension to the debate which never had been present in a 
significant way.231 In its rhetoric, the Swedish pool of welfare resources was threatened by the arrival 
of ‘economic refugees’.232 The notion of the ‘limited resources of the welfare state’ was especially 
highlighted in the public’s imagination between late 1989 and early 1990, when the Social 
Democratic government had to take quite drastic economic measures to address the developing 
national economic crisis.233  
In that sense, the rise of New Democracy fits Will Kymlicka’s analysis of changing notions of solidarity 
under neoliberal pressures, to a certain degree. While he focuses mostly on increasing labour 
migration as part of globalised neoliberal economies, I would argue that his analysis of ‘solidarity 
without inclusiveness’ fits the support that New Democracy managed to quickly gain.234  The welfare 
chauvinistic rhetoric of New Democracy emphasised that the welfare state, despite its flaws, was the 
achievement of the solidarity of the Swedish people, but did not include immigrants in its notion of 
‘Swedishness’. As Kymlicka also describes, the cultural or ethnic dimension of the ‘threat’ that 
immigrants pose is thereby equal to, or even greater than, their economic pressures on the welfare 
state.235 Similar concerns had, as I described in the previous chapter, influenced the Danish 
government’s decision to implement a dispersal policy in 1998. The economic drawbacks of dispersal, 
in the form of fewer possibilities for employment, were compensated by the reduced population 
density, and therefore perceived cultural threat, of refugee groups within Denmark. 
Kymlicka mostly views welfare chauvinism as a form of protest against neoliberalist economic 
changes,236 while New Democracy favoured neoliberal economic policies similar to the centre-right 
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Moderate Party.237 New Democracy nonetheless managed to combine the two by framing itself as a 
protest party. Changes in the economy created mistrust amongst part of the electorate. 238 The party 
managed to channel these feelings against the established parties by focusing on topics like the 
‘hidden cost of immigration’ that the established parties were somehow keeping hidden from the 
general public.239 I would thereby argue that New Democracy’s introduction of notions of ethnic 
tensions in the public and political debates allowed them both to set the tone of the debate, and 
profile themselves as the new anti-establishment party that addressed issues other parties would not. 
Voting for New Democracy could therefore also contain a certain protest-element.240   
From an international context, neither this protest dimension, nor neoliberal policies or ‘cultural 
arguments’, could really explain the large impact that New Democracy had on Swedish policy in the 
early 1990s. Denmark, for example, also went through a period of economic globalisation and 
neoliberalisation, and had a public debate regarding sovereignty over border policy within the 
European Union.241 Furthermore, Denmark had its own anti-immigration party, with a strong protest-
dimension, in the form of the Progress Party.242 In fact, that party (though initially predominantly 
anti-taxation) had existed since the 1970s.  
I would therefore also argue that New Democracy’s influence stemmed from its ‘shock value’ when it 
entered politics. The Danish Progress Party was not a new party anymore in the late 1980s, and 
drastic immigration-restrictions were discussed within the ‘mainstream’ Danish parties around this 
time as well.243 While they gained about 9 percent of the vote in the 1988 elections, their electoral 
results had hovered around the 6,5 percent mark throughout the early 1990s. However, as 
mentioned earlier, within the Swedish political debates, restrictions like those in the Lucia Decision 
were already deemed somewhat extreme, let alone the proposition of anti-immigration policies. 
From a political culture perspective, I would therefore argue that New Democracy’s rapidly 
increasing popularity, despite it being outside the ‘accepted’ range of immigration-restrictiveness, 
prompted the mainstream parties into knee-jerk reactions to try and mitigate the party’s influence. 
By trying to de-politicise migration in the 1991 election campaigns, or taking a pro-refugee stance 
and refusing to cooperate with New Democracy, the established parties sought to prevent the party 
from gaining political legitimacy.244 
Whether New Democracy was hit with a ‘proper’ cordon sanitaire during the elections, and the 
subsequent government term, is up for debate. David Art, for example, argues that (in the opposition) 
New Democracy’s parliamentary votes were still instrumental to the implementation of the 
government’s economic policies, and certain newspapers devoted plenty of articles to the party, as a 
‘good story’.245 Other authors argue that New Democracy’s access to the media was actually strained,  
by comparison to other parties.246 Nevertheless, their degree of media accessibility also fluctuated 
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over time, and the party’s founders were already well-known media figures before formally founding 
New Democracy.247 
Regardless of the ‘properness’ of the cordon sanitaire against New Democracy, and the extent of its 
popularity, I would argue that New Democracy’s main influence on the Swedish asylum-policy 
developments manifested itself through the reaction of the other parties. As Abiri argues, the party’s 
populist anti-immigration message led to the delay of the already planned asylum-restrictions in 
favour of a continuation of the status quo regarding refugee-acceptance.248 The ‘shock’ to the 
political system that New Democracy caused therefore, in my opinion, led to the continuation of a 
policy that was the opposite of New Democracy’s propositions. While both the Moderate Party and 
the Social Democrats (the two largest parties) were already in favour immigration-restrictions, the 
Moderate-led coalition upheld the pro-refugee election promises of their Liberal Party coalition 
partner. By doing so, the parties could distance themselves from New Democracy. In that sense, New 
Democracy had a major impact on Swedish policy, though not as they intended. As I described in 
chapter three, this ‘distancing motivation’ also meant that the implementation of a more restrictive 
border policy gained a majority in parliament after New Democracy failed, since there was no anti -
immigration party left that the ‘mainstream’ parties wanted to distance themselves from. 
Though the Danish Progress Party also took an anti-immigration stance in political debates, I would 
argue that they did not have the same apparent influence on the Danish decision-making process as 
New Democracy, because it did not deviate from the Danish political culture to the same degree. Nor 
did the party have the same momentum during this period. The Progress Party had lost its novelty -
value to a certain degree, as the party was already established in the 1970s. Furthermore, the party, 
though not mainstream yet, had become ‘integrated’ into Danish politics throughout the 1980s, as 
minority right-wing governments depended on its parliamentary votes for certain reforms. 249 As a 
result, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the party generally won around 7 percent of the vote. 
Although less than the 12 percent expected, the fact that New Democracy gained a similar 
percentage of the vote in 1991 shows the sudden popularity of the party in Sweden, as the Progress 
Party had to become relatively established to gain a similar electoral success. Also, as David Art 
shows, while national parties showed little willingness for enduring cooperation with the Progress 
Party, they did often include the party at a municipal level.250 The permissiveness of these (primarily 
right-wing) parties towards the Progress Party’s politics would have made a cordon sanitaire 
impossible.251 Nonetheless, the party’s focus on (hypothetical) ethnic and cultural tensions still often 
met with criticism in debates.252 
5.2. The Fall of New Democracy and the Progress Party 
Despite the political shock that the establishment of New Democracy caused, the party itself was 
relatively short-lived, losing all of its parliamentary seats in the 1994 general elections. Art therefore 
gives it the apt description of a ‘flash party’.253 The Progress Party would not fare much better after 
dissident members founded the Danish People’s Party in 1995. In order to explain the downfall of 
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these parties, I firstly want to look back at the factors that facilitated them at the beginning of the 
1990s. 
While New Democracy’s economic policy fit in with a general right-wing tendency towards 
neoliberalism in the late 1980s, the Swedish economic crisis swiftly turned the electorate’s favour 
towards leftist economic policies.254 As a result of the crisis, the main foci of the 1994 election 
campaign focused more heavily on economic policy than socio-economic issues like asylum and 
immigration.255 While I would have expected immigration issues to become an even greater topic of 
interest in times of economic crisis, New Democracy could not manage to politicise immigration to 
any significant extent.256 Jens Rydgren explains this absence of socio-cultural issues as a return to the 
‘traditional’ socio-economic conflict between the Social Democrats and the centre-right Moderate 
Party, as ‘traditional’ issues like the welfare state were usually viewed through those two parties’ 
economic lenses.257 While immigration briefly became a contentious issue during the 1991 elections, 
the economic crisis therefore seemed to ‘reset’ the debates to issues that had already been points of 
contention for a much longer period. 
The changing economic winds, and reduced attention for immigration issues, meant that New 
Democracy lost a large part of the political opportunity structure that enabled it to mobilise both  
neoliberal and anti-immigration voters.258 However, policy mismatches with the electorate were not 
the largest cause for its decline. New Democracy’s rising popularity drew in an i ncreasing number of 
local sub-parties and inexperienced staff members, but the party’s organisation was unable to 
properly vet everyone, impose a singly policy line, or to keep out right-wing extremists. As a result, 
both the national party and its local branches suffered from increasing infighting and violent internal 
debates.259 This disorder within the party became total when a leadership-struggle broke out in 1994, 
which led to the party leader’s resignation.260 New Democracy failed to clear the electoral threshold 
in the 1994 elections and, with a dwindling municipal representation, would not gain any more 
parliamentary seats before its dissolution in the year 2000.  
The impact that parties’ organisational structure have on their electoral success also becomes 
apparent in the case of the Danish Progress Party. In his book, David Art distinguishes three types of 
activists that might join a political party: extremists, moderates, and opportunists. He thereby argues 
that extremists usually fail to connect with democratic institutions as they rigidly follow their 
ideology, while opportunists might have little loyalty to the party and its policy in favour of personal 
(economic) gains.261 In terms of their ability to follow a coherent party-wide policy-line and 
cooperate with other parties in parliament, Art therefore argues that a successful party mostly needs 
moderate activists and party members.262  
Since the late 1980s, there had been tensions between the pragmatic (moderate) and extremist 
elements within the Danish Progress Party. Similarly to New Democracy, the party did not manage to 
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properly vet its candidates, allowing a relatively large percentage of extremists and opportunists to 
join.263 Eventually a leadership struggle emerged between the moderate and the extremist factions 
within the party, which was ‘won’ by the moderates, but was not beneficial to its image as a ‘proper’ 
party to vote on or cooperate with.264 It has to be said that Pia Kjærsgaard, the (moderate) party 
leader, did manage to rehabilitate the Progress Party’s image, to a certain degree, during the 
Yugoslavia Crisis. While the party was usually shunned during debates in the early 1990s, they 
steadily started to cooperate with the Liberal and Conservative parties in the opposition, through for 
example jointly formulating amendments on immigration-restrictions.265 During the 1994 election 
campaigns, the Progress Party even cooperated as a supporting partner with a liberal -conservative 
coalition (that ultimately lost to the Social Democratic coalition).266  
However, while the public image of the Progress Party was being rehabilitated, the internal power 
struggles between its moderate and extremist factions simmered on. In the summer of 1995, these 
tensions came to a head when Kjærsgaard’s moderates split from the Progress Party, taking a third of 
its representatives with them, and founded the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti).267 Similarly 
to the Swedish New Democracy, this infighting appears to have spelt the end for the Progress Party. 
After the moderates split from the party, the Progress Party quickly lost its electoral support, barely 
crossing the electoral threshold in the 1998 elections, and as good as completely disappearing after 
the 2001 ones. Rydgren describes how the immigration-discourse of the Progress Party gradually 
became more extreme after Kjærsgaard’s departure, culminating in a series of controversial 
statements between 1999 and 2001, like proposing policy to deport all Muslims and using phrases 
like ‘Mohammedan pests’. The Danish People’s Party looked moderate in comparison.268 The 
extremism of the Progress Party’s statements effectively meant that it lost its political legitimacy, 
while boosting that of the Danish People’s Party.269 Though the party never officially disbanded, and 
has participated in several local elections since 2001, the Progress Party never had any noteworthy 
political success again.  
5.3. Anti-Immigration Parties after 1995 
After New Democracy’s electoral defeat in 1994, Swedish politics would not see a viable anti -
immigration party for the remainder of the decade. The Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterne), 
who are the established anti-immigration party today, suffered from much the same issues of 
extremism and poor party organisation throughout the second half of the 1990s. 270 Though it 
gradually managed to soften its extremist (neo-Nazi) image, the Sweden Democrats would only enter 
parliament in 2010. The situation was quite different, however, in Denmark, where the Danish 
People’s Party would build upon Kjærsgaard’s work for the Progress Party to profile themselves as a 
legitimate party and coalition partner. 
To explain the success of the Danish People’s Party, as opposed to its predecessor, it is firstly 
important to note that Kjærsgaard took her experiences with the Progress Party’s instability to heart. 
While the latter failed to properly vet its candidates, Kjærsgaard implemented an extensive selection 
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process and centralised organisational structure that effectively managed to bar extremists from 
gaining any noteworthy position within her party.271 Yet, the culture of infighting that led to the 
party’s foundation never completely went away in the early years.272 Her promise that the Danish 
People’s Party would follow the same policy as her former party, as well as the Progress Party’s 
increasing radicalisation, enabled the new party to draw in an increasing number of the latter's 
disgruntled voter base and parliamentary members.273 
In terms of a clear policy-position, the Folkeparti also had a distinct advantage over the Progress 
Party. The Progress Party started out in the 1970s as an anti-taxation party, and it never completely 
lost the anarchist image of its early days.274 Kjærsgaard, however, was able to draw on her work for 
the Progress Party and managed to establish a strong anti-immigration image from the start.275 From 
a policy-perspective, the People’s Party also focused much more heavily and exclusively on ethno -
nationalist anti-immigration reforms, whereas tax reforms remained one of the key pillars of the 
Progress Party.276 In that sense, the image that the party adopted, combining ethno-nationalism and 
populism, seems inspired by and similar to other (successful) anti -immigration parties in Europe, like 
the French Front National.277   
With a better image than the Progress Party, and a clear anti-immigration and anti-establishment 
political profile, the People’s Party was able to jump into the niche that their predecessors used to 
occupy within Danish politics. Though parties like the Liberal Party, as we have seen earlier, also took 
an asylum-critical position within political debates, the People’s Party managed to present itself as an 
alternative for an electorate that was disgruntled with the established parties. 278 Besides an anti-
immigration voter base, the party furthermore established itself as the authoritative anti-EU party 
and, like New Democracy with neoliberalist voters, also managed to draw in anti -establishment 
voters that did not necessarily share its socio-cultural views.279 
As the Danish People’s Party was only founded after the  1994 general elections, the first ‘real’ test of 
its viability in the eyes of the electorate took place during the 1997 municipal elections. After the 
votes were counted, the party was the fifth largest party on a municipal  (5 percent of the vote) and 
county (6.5 percent) level.280 While the party was not universally liked, it managed to deliver several 
vice-mayors in the process, showing that the People’s Party was seen as a possible coalition partner 
for the established parties on at least a local level.281 This willingness to cooperate on a local level 
would gradually turn into increasing cooperation at a national level, culminating in the party’s 
support for a right-wing coalition government after the 2001 national elections.  
When New Democracy was hampered in Sweden by an unofficial cordon sanitaire, as mentioned 
earlier, the two main spheres in which the party was denied a platform, and a degree of political 
legitimacy, were politics and the media. With regard to the Danish People’s Party, neither seemed 
willing to implement a cordon. As a matter of fact, the media might have played an instrumental role 
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in mobilising support for the party, especially around the 1997 integration debates, and local 
elections. 
As Lise Togeby shows, the quantity of the debates in newspapers regarding Danish asylum policy was 
on the decline after the end of the Bosnian Crisis, but issues regarding ‘cultural differences’ and 
criminality by immigrants actually received more coverage than earlier.282 One of the more publicised 
and influential media campaigns ran in the tabloid Ekstra Bladet in 1995.The campaign, with the title 
‘the price of goodness’ (Godhedens pris), featured stories of (alleged) welfare state abuses by 
foreigners.283  
Since Togeby published her article in 1997, she was not able  to include an even larger campaign by 
Ekstra Bladet in that year, which would propel the popularity of the Danish People’s Party. Similarly 
to its 1995 campaign, the newspaper ran a series of stories criticising the Danish ‘multicultural’ 
society, and addressed the ‘natural hostility’ between the ‘Danish’ and ‘foreign’ (essentialised) 
cultures.284 As I described in the previous chapter, the supposed misuse of welfare resources by 
immigrant groups was also addressed by the tabloid which linked notions of cultural threat with 
welfare debates. The campaign was a close collaboration between Ekstra Bladet and the Danish 
People’s Party, with members and supporters of the latter supplying the newspaper with articles, 
interviews, and letters to the editor. The campaign about ‘ethnic tensions’ within Danish society 
turned out to be a mutually beneficial undertaking, with an increase in both readers and voters. 285 
Art sees the relatively positive reception of this campaign therefore also as a sign that the People’s 
Party, or at least its rhetoric, became acceptable for a larger social group within Danish society. 286 
The collaboration between the Danish People’s Party and Ekstra Bladet in my opinion follows the 
broader theoretical literature on the way that populist parties and the media benefit from each other. 
Eatwell, for example, writes about the use of media outlets for ‘framing’ purposes, which in this case 
includes framing the immigration debates through an ethno-nationalist lens.287 Mazzoleni argues that 
media outlets, like Ekstra Bladet, might be willing to facilitate such agenda-setting if it provides them 
with more readers and viewers.288 The extent to which the People’s Party’s discourse spread due to 
its access to the media would become clear during the 2001 general election campaigns, when Pia 
Kjærsgaard became the second most quoted person on immigration matters in the Danish media. 289 
Rydgren argues that the Danish People’s Party’s prominence in immigration issues in the late 1990s, 
and early 2000s, also stemmed from the willingness of other (right-wing) parties, to adopt far-right 
discourse and policies. He gives the example of the Liberal Party (Venstre), which, influenced by the 
growing popularity of the People’s Party, made increasingly unsympathetic remarks about 
immigration between the integration debate of 1997, and the 2001 general elections. 290 The further 
politicisation of immigration also gave the Liberal Party an opportunity to criticise the Social 
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Democrats, who took a comparatively more generous stance on immigration and asylum matters,291 
as the debates regarding the 1997 integration policy for example also showed.  
5.4. Shifts in the Political Culture of ‘Mainstream’ Parties 
In the previous parts of this chapter, I have posited reasons for the varying degrees of success for 
Danish and Swedish anti-immigration parties. However, continuing from the example of Venstre’s 
gradual turn towards anti-immigration discourse, I would argue that it is important to look at the 
ways in which these anti-immigration parties have influenced the policy-developments of the 
‘mainstream’ parties as well. 
Taking Sweden as a starting point again, the appearance of New Democracy does not seem to have 
made a lasting impact on the general Swedish political culture, or the general discourse of its political 
parties. At least not one that persevered after the party disappeared from parliament. Earlier, I 
already mentioned how the potential popularity of New Democracy caused the right-wing coalition 
to (initially) maintain Sweden’s generous asylum system.292 But when New Democracy lost the 1994 
elections, as I described in chapter three, the Social Democrats continued with the 1991 plans to 
restrict the Swedish border policy. They thereby received support from the Moderate Party who, in 
the centre-right coalition, tried to maintain a generous immigration policy, but supported restrictions 
in 1991. I would therefore argue that, despite New Democracy’s influence on the pro -refugee stance 
of the Swedish (centre-right) government parties, this change was only of a temporary nature.  
The electoral victories of the Liberal Party and the other centre-right parties fit into a general 
economic ‘turn to the right’ of the Swedish electorate around the late 1980s and early 1990s. After 
all, the left-wing parties, regardless of their immigration-policy, had their greatest loss yet during the 
1991 elections.293 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the economic crisis seems to have reversed 
this turn back to the left, leading to the electoral victory of the Social Democrats in the 1994 
elections (and the loss of New Democracy).294 In that sense, economic trends seem to have had a 
larger impact on the Swedish political culture than its (short-lived) anti-immigration parties during 
this period. However, part of this return to the ‘pre-1991’ situation might also have been due to the 
fact that there was no viable anti-immigration party in Sweden after New Democracy failed, although 
this absence might have been caused by the economic crisis as well.  
The ‘turn to the left’ during the economic crisis not only deprived New Democracy of its neoliberal 
niche, but also re-politicised the socio-economic cleavage in which the Social Democrats and the 
Moderate Party were the traditional choices, while socio-cultural issues were downplayed.295 
Rydgren thereby argues that the relative absence of anti-immigration parties in Sweden was due to 
the salience of this socio-economic cleavage and de-politicisation of immigration-issues.296 Since the 
Moderate Party and the Social Democrats provided enough variety in economic policy,297 no populist 
anti-immigration party could use the same political opportunity structure New Democracy had.  
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The situation in Denmark appears slightly different. As mentioned earlier, one of the most striking 
developments was the gradual acceptance of the Progress Party (as well as the later Danish People’s 
Party) as a potential political ally for the ‘mainstream’ right-wing parties. The Progress Party’s anti-
immigration policies did not deviate that much from the dominant political culture like New 
Democracy’s in Sweden. Anti-immigration was, for example, less of a political taboo, as extensive 
restrictions to the provisions for immigrants were already discussed by the mainstream parties at the 
beginning of the 1990s.298 The relative eagerness, by comparison to Sweden, with which the Danish 
parliament implemented temporary protection measures during the Bosnian Crisis also points in this 
direction. 
Cooperation with anti-immigration populist parties was not exclusive to Danish parties, as both New 
Democracy and the Progress Party cooperated with local or parliamentary ‘established’ parties to a 
certain degree.299 However, whereas Sweden did not have a viable anti-immigration party after the 
collapse of New Democracy, the Danish People’s Party managed to build further upon the political 
legitimacy that (the moderate) Pia Kjærsgaard garnered for the Progress Party. While the degree of 
cooperation between the centre-right parties and the People’s Party diminished during the 1998 
election campaign, accepting their possible support during the government formation but refusing to 
have any official contacts;300 the degree of indirect influence that the People’s Party had on the other 
party became more apparent during this time as well. 
At the same time, as Rydgren argues, the Social Democratic and Liberal socio-economic policies 
started to drift towards each other, reducing the variance within that cleavage. 301 In contrast to the 
situation in Sweden, this convergence meant that the socio-cultural cleavage became increasingly 
politicised as an area in which parties could distinguish themselves from one another. 302 Earlier in 
this thesis, I already mentioned how the media facilitated the public and political debates regarding 
socio-cultural issues. The Danish People’s Party, with anti-immigration policy as its main pillar, 
therefore also gained political legitimacy. 
Earlier on in this chapter, I already wrote about the adoption of far-right discourse by the Danish 
Liberal Party from 1998 onwards, influenced by the People’s Party’s growing popularity. The Social 
Democratic policies, however, also shifted due to the party’s successes. While the Social Democrats, 
in the early 1990s presented themselves as a relatively pro-refugee party, its policies were 
increasingly attacked by both the Liberal Party and the Danish People’s Party throughout the decade. 
As the party was losing voters to the People’s Party, their stance on immigration became 
progressively unsympathetic.303 Whereas the Swedish political parties tried to refute New 
Democracy’s anti-immigration policies, the Danish Social Democrats’ reaction was not to defend its 
humanitarian viewpoints, but to gradually tighten the Danish asylum system.304 The cultural 
integrationist turn in the Danish integration policy that I described in the previous chapter would be 
an example of this. The relative de-politicisation of the Swedish cultural cleavage thereby also 
provides another reason for the absence of this cultural turn within their integration policy.  
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The Danish People’s Party was also aware of the influence that it had on the policy-development of 
the mainstream parties. During the debates regarding the implementation of the integration policy, 
Pia Kjærsgaard for example pointed out that it appeared as if the government’s turn towards 
restrictiveness was influenced largely by the “very, very large advances” that the People’s Party was 
making.305 
After the 1998 elections, which the Social Democrats won by a narrow margin, the cooperation 
between the Danish People’s Party and the  centre-right parties would increase again. While the 
Liberal Party gladly politicised immigration-issues during the 1998 election campaigns, against the 
wishes of the Social Democrats,306 the party leader refused to focus on matters related to identity 
politics. After the party leadership changed due to their narrow election loss, the Liberal Party heavily 
focused on immigrants and refugees during the 2001 election campaign.307 At the same time, the 
party leader published an article in the journal of the Danish People’s Party, stating that cooperation 
between the two parties was desirable in order to achieve political change.308 They would keep this 
promise after the 2001 elections, when a Liberal/Conservative coalition won the elections with the 
official support from the Danish People’s Party. As Rydgren argues, the position of the People’s Party 
within the Danish political culture became fully normalised at that point, as their rhetoric and 
discourse did not differ too much from the other right-wing parties anymore.309 
5.5. Conclusion 
When discussing the differences between the Danish and Swedish asylum policies throughout the 
1990s, the differing position of anti-immigration parties within their political spheres should not be 
overlooked. While none of the Danish or Swedish anti-immigration parties was part of a government 
coalition before 2001, their influence on the political culture of the ‘mainstream’ parties also 
impacted the states’ asylum policies. The gradual turn towards restrictiveness in Denmark 
throughout the 1990s for both the Social Democrats and the Liberal Party is a good example.  
With regard to the reasons for the success of anti-immigration parties, the Danish and Swedish 
examples seem to centre around two main concepts. On the one hand, the parties  were dependent 
on an anti-immigration niche within the political landscape, possibly combined with the reputation of 
being a ‘protest party’.310 New Democracy thereby also showed that catering to changing economic 
preferences with the electorate, like increasing neoliberalisation,311 or the politicisation of socio-
economic and socio-cultural cleavages,312 influences an anti-immigration party’s chance of success.   
I would furthermore argue that a party’s degree of deviation from the general political culture 
impacts its influence and legitimacy. New Democracy’s anti-immigration rhetoric was for example so 
controversial that it was one of the reasons for the government to maintain a generous refugee 
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system.313 However, as the Progress Party initially showed, a smaller gap between anti-immigration 
rhetoric and the political culture prevents the other parties from enforcing a cordon sanitaire. 314 
Furthermore, as Art shows, political legitimacy and party success also depends on the internal 
organisation and structure of a party.315 While the Progress Party and New Democracy were both 
moderately successful, one of the reasons for their eventual failure was the prevalence of extremist 
elements within their parties, and the inability to form coherent policy. Meanwhile, one of the 
reasons for the success of the Danish People’s Party was its ‘moderate’ reputation, and willingness to 
cooperate with other parties. 
In terms of political culture, a certain amount of deviance from the general political culture might 
therefore be beneficial for an anti-immigration party’s electoral success, despite possible cordon 
sanitaires. New Democracy could for example overcome the (debatable) cordon by framing 
themselves as a protest party. But too great a deviance, through for example the prevalence of 
extremist factions within a party, can ruin a party’s legitimacy in the eyes of both the electorate and 
other political parties. 
The Danish People’s Party’s rise also fits inside theories regarding populist parties and media -usages. 
Their cooperation with Ekstra Bladet for example fits Eatwell’s argument that anti-immigration 
parties can use media-coverage for framing purposes.316 This cooperation is mutually beneficial, as 
the amount of readers and viewers of these media-outlets might also grow.317 
Ultimately, though, I would argue that the Danish People’s Party can really be described as a ‘success’ 
because it both managed to present itself as a legitimate political party, and by the willingness of the 
centre-right parties to cooperate with it and move towards them in terms of their discourse and 
policies. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
I began this thesis with a brief description of some of the recent developments regarding the 
openness of Danish and Swedish asylum policy. I thereby argued that while both states have become 
more restrictive in recent years, Denmark has become especially so. This comparison between both 
states was also an integral part of my main question, which focused on trying to answer when, how 
and why Denmark adopted a harsher asylum policy than Sweden between 1989 and 2001. 
When discussing asylum policy, it is firstly important to distinguish between its external and internal 
elements. In this thesis, those are represented by the chapters on border and integration policy, 
respectively. While both spheres were often simultaneously influenced by policy changes, the 
motivations to change them and the degree of restrictiveness present within them often differed. For 
example, the Swedish border policy was significantly tightened in 1996, while the integration policy 
of 1997 was comparatively open towards granting immigrants access to Swedish social amenities. In 
terms of legitimations, changes to both spheres were also framed through different issues. The 
cultural turn that can be seen within Danish integration policy was, for example, relatively absent 
from the border policy debates. The distinction between these internal and external elements 
therefore allows more nuance in an analysis of restrictiveness within asylum policy. 
With regard to the 'when' part of my research question, I hypothesised in chapter 2 that the main 
divergence between Danish and Swedish asylum policy emerged in the second half of the 1990s. My 
analysis in chapter three confirms this hypothesis. It is important to acknowledge that Denmark and 
Sweden played different roles during the Cold War and that, before 1989, Sweden already had a 
significantly more permissive refugee policy, although Denmark also maintained a relatively generous 
refugee policy. Nevertheless, chapter 3 showed that there were more similarities than differences to 
be found in both countries' policies during the early 1990s, which makes Denmark's turn towards 
restrictiveness in the second half of the 1990s more notable. 
While both countries differed slightly in relation to border issues like temporary asylum, the main 
differences between the Danish and Swedish openness towards refugees can be found in their 
respective integration policies during this period. The degree to which immigrants were singled out 
as a specifically problematic group within society heavily differed between the two countries. 
Influenced by the economic crisis of the early 1990s, both states placed greater emphasis on a 
workline element within their respective welfare states. However, when comparing the Swedish 
Integration policy of 1997 and the Danish one of 1998, the Danish one took a decidedly heavier 
cultural integrationist and restrictive turn. Under the ‘rights and duties’ in relation to the Danish 
workline, ‘becoming Danish’ became a duty, as it was framed as a way to facilitate migrants’ entry 
onto the labour market. 
With regard to how the Danish asylum system became more restrictive, I looked at Borevi’s model of 
a Swedish ‘state-centred’ integration approach versus the Danish ‘society-centred’ one to explain the 
divergence in both countries’ integration policy towards asylum seekers and refugees.318 As 
hypothesised in chapter 2, the Danish restrictiveness manifested itself through a focus on cultural 
integration. The Danish policy’s focus on becoming Danish, in combination with its emphasis on the 
workline, fits with Borevi’s focus on integration as a way to combat threats to the welfare state. 
However, contrary to my hypothesis, I would argue that different conceptions of the welfare state 
alone do not fully explain the differences between the Danish and Swedish asylum approach 
between 1989 and 2001. For example, the turn towards cultural integration in Denmark was carried 
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out by the same Social Democratic party that, earlier in this period, advocated a re latively open 
stance towards refugees. 
To explain the different degrees of restrictiveness in Danish and Swedish policy, I therefore argue 
that the varying degrees of success that anti-immigration parties had in both countries are also 
important factors to consider, besides the earlier mentioned differences in integration philosophy. 
Apart from economic pressures, the Danish turn towards cultural integration could also be linked to 
the political ‘pressure’ that was caused by the increasing electoral success of national anti-
immigration parties. As the example of the Danish People’s Party shows, a party thereby does not 
necessarily need to be part of the ruling coalition to influence a government’s policy towards 
restrictiveness.  
Differences in political culture and national identity help explain both the differences in anti -
immigration success in both countries, and the varying degrees of restrictiveness present in their 
asylum policy. The self-image of Sweden as a ‘humanitarian country’, and the political consensus  for 
a (relatively) pro-immigration stance were, for example, both reflected in the permissive asylum 
policy and the relative failure of anti-immigration parties in Sweden.  
It is thereby also important to view the Danish and Swedish asylum policy through a discursive or 
‘spectacle’ lens. The degree of restrictiveness was used to appease groups within the Danish and 
Swedish societies. Both turns towards openness, like the Swedish one in 1991, or restrictiveness, like 
the Danish cultural integration policy, thereby served to convey political discourse. The call for 
burden-sharing after the border restrictions during the Bosnian Crisis also shows that national policy 
can be used to influence international decision-making processes. 
Returning to my main question, I would argue that two main dimensions are important when 
discussing the reasons behind changes to Danish and Swedish asylum policy: economic (welfare) 
considerations and political culture. The developments within Danish and Swedish asylum policy 
during this period show that a multi-dimensional approach is necessary to explain the reasons behind 
policy changes. For example, the relatively large impact that the economic crisis of the early 1990s 
had on the Swedish unemployment rates could have provided a legitimation for border-
restrictiveness or the implementation of more restrictive integration policy. Measures like those in 
the ‘Lucia Decision’ were, after all, mostly reactions to (expected) questions of limited economic 
resources. Instead, political reasons like New Democracy’s breaking of taboos delayed these 
restrictions until 1996, when the crisis was nearing its end. Furthermore, political self-images like the 
reputation of humanitarianism heavily impacted the (Swedish) debates regarding the 
implementation of temporary asylum measures. The above examples therefore show that economic 
downturns do not necessarily immediately correlate to asylum restrictiveness, but that political 
culture is also a deciding factor in changes to countries’ policy.  
The turn towards restrictiveness in Danish integration policy appears to follow Kymlicka’s model of 
neoliberal pressures on welfare solidarity. The welfare chauvinist rhetoric of anti -immigration parties 
and their (temporary) electoral success, could in both countries be placed within his category of 
increasing ‘solidarity without inclusivity’.319 The different impact of populist policy within both states, 
however, shows that neoliberal pressures do not necessarily automatically equate to tensions within 
immigration debates, or to increasing popularity of anti-immigration parties. For example, the 
Swedish Moderate Party advocated neoliberal economic policies that were quite similar to New 
Democracy’s in 1991, but actually followed a relatively pro-refugee stance due to their political 
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cooperation with pro-refugee parties. Furthermore, I would argue that the Social Democratic 
attempts in 1997 to re-work Swedish national identity to also include foreigners, even though 
neoliberal foci on individualism were present in their integration policy, came close to what Kymlicka 
describes as ‘inclusive solidarity’. While Kymlicka posits the concept as relatively hypothetical, his 
premise of an inclusive solidarity through a multicultural welfare state, in my opinion, bears a certain 
resemblance to these inclusive intentions of the Swedish government.320 Since Kymlicka draws 
heavily on the Anglosphere countries to test his model , the Swedish case shows that a broader 
perspective might be needed to construct a more comprehensive model on the relation between 
neoliberal pressures and the implementation of welfare chauvinistic policy. 
The economic crisis politicised the socio-economic cleavage within Swedish politics, while 
downplaying the socio-cultural one. Protests against neoliberalism, which could take the form of 
welfare chauvinism, were thereby also thrust back into the ‘traditional’ economic debates between 
the two main Swedish parties. The relatively low variance between the Danish parties’ socio -
economic policies, on the other hand, could be seen as contributing to the increasing politicis ation of 
the Danish socio-cultural cleavage during this period, which coincided with a turn towards 
restrictiveness. I would therefore argue that there is a correlation between neoliberalism and asylum 
restrictiveness, but that this is heavily influenced by the political culture of a society; specifically, the 
degree of politicisation of its socio-cultural and economic cleavages. 
Throughout this thesis, I have focused predominantly on a national level of policy -making, with 
regard to Danish and Swedish asylum developments. I have thereby tried to describe the influence of 
international actors and events when relevant, like the UNHCR’s advice and broader Scandinavian 
multi-lateral arrangements. However, this focus meant that I could not make a full analysis of the 
influence that the local, municipal level of governance had on the development and implementation 
of national asylum policy, though I have mentioned the influence of these local actors on national 
politics when possible, for example, through their presence in the media. I thereby described how 
local parties often had different opinions regarding the placement and integration of refugees than 
their national counterparts. As hopefully became clear in this thesis, the interplay between different 
levels of governance has had a significant influence on the decisions that were being made on the 
national policy-making levels in Denmark and Sweden.  
For future research, I would therefore suggest that it would be interesting to look at the differences 
regarding openness towards refugees in the discourse of local and national political parties. If 
possible, an analysis of internal party discussions would in my opinion provide interesting insights 
into the decision-making and policy-development processes of ruling parties. I would thereby argue 
that this interplay between local and national parties is a relatively under-researched topic within the 
field of Scandinavian migration history. 
Lastly, I started this thesis with a brief description of the Danish and Swedi sh responses to the recent 
'Syrian Refugee Crisis'. Though this thesis only covered the period between 1989 and 2001, I think it 
would be interesting for future research to see how the divergence between Danish and Swedish 
asylum policy developed after 2001. In terms of political culture, the relative success of the Sweden 
Democrats, for example, and the re-politicisation of asylum policy as a result of the recent crisis form 
a contrast to the Swedish situation before 2001 that I described above. A similar study as this one 
would, in my opinion, provide interesting insights into the recent developments in Scandinavian 
asylum policy. 
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